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Introduction 
In May 1930, the internationally-renowned Italian parasitologist, Gustavo Pitta-
luga, (who had settled in Spain) and one of his disciples, Francisco Ruiz Morote, 
visited the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco after attending the International 
Conference on Malaria held in Algiers. They were accompanied by Captain Dr. 
Joaquín Sanz Astolfi, Director of the Laboratory of Clinical Analysis of the 
Tettouan Military Hospital, who had also travelled with them to Algiers as repre-
sentative of the Protectorate’s Health Services (Sanz Astolfi 1931–1932). During 
their short trip, Pittaluga and Morote got a glimpse of the Protectorate’s health 
organisation and institutions, its sanitary conditions as well as the plans and 
outcomes of the first anti-malarial campaign launched the previous year. After the 
visit, they published a paper in Pittaluga’s journal, Medicina de los Países 
Cálidos, which also appeared in África, the journal of the Spanish Army in 
Morocco. 
In that paper, Pittaluga claimed that Spanish health initiatives in Morocco had 
been  
guided in an excessively military sense, abandoning some of the main scien-
tific and public health orientations which must be the base, never to be for-
gotten, of every doctor’s actions […] (Pittaluga & Ruiz Morote 1930).  
But he added “that all prevention has vanished on contact with a cosy, full-of-
promises reality” (Pittaluga & Ruiz Morote 1930). Morote confirmed this impres-
sion when he wrote that  
remembering the visit is enough to eagerly wish that the work developed there 
would become better known in the metropolis and to know to what extent pub-
lic health work has contributed and is contributing to improving the population 
health status and to easing Protectorate’s duties.  
Out of all initiatives, for Morote  
the most impressive ones are those concerning rural dispensaries [strictly 
called “dispensaries for natives”]. They are advanced posts of civilization, now 
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enjoying the peace they contributed to sow in such an efficient way (Pittaluga 
& Ruiz Morote 1930). 
In fact, by the time of Pittaluga and Morote’s travel, there existed a network of 58 
“dispensaries for natives” in Spanish Morocco, ten of them in the towns and 48 in 
the countryside, spread throughout the Protectorate’s territory. They were run by 
Spanish doctors and Spanish and Moroccan auxiliary personnel. They generally 
had exploratory, analytical and surgical equipment and small infirmaries, and they 
were provided periodically with drugs, vaccines and, when necessary, with 
disinfection devices. These dispensaries had begun to offer outpatient, clinical and 
surgical care and were used as the basis for the launching of the first health 
campaigns against malaria, typhoid fever or syphilis (Delgado 1930). The network 
of dispensaries may be taken as a symbol of the deployment of a health system in 
Spanish Morocco. Its presence was represented throughout the 20,000 km2 of 
territory, and its coverage of a population that overall was estimated at between 
600,000 and one million inhabitants. 
But things had been quite different in the years prior to the Rif War (1921–
1927) and, obviously, in the course of it. Despite a tradition of medical activities 
in Morocco since the last quarter of the 19th century, Spain was unable to establish 
more than four urban and sixteen countryside dispensaries in its Protectorate zone 
before 1921. In this first period of existence, activities of dispensaries for natives 
were hindered by personnel and equipment problems, by the lack of proper facili-
ties and funding, and by the lack of administrative co-ordination between the 
ministries of State and War and between Tettouan and Melilla. Spain also acted 
under pressure of measures taken by France in its much larger Moroccan Protec-
torate, exhibited in either its inability to match developments there, or in the 
constant menace of French interference in the Spanish zone (Martínez Antonio et 
al. 2003; Molero Mesa et al. 2002; Molero Mesa 2003). 
However, as this paper attempts to show, another major obstacle for the crea-
tion of dispensaries for natives during this period was the relative persistence of 
Morocco’s public health structures and agency. Since the 19th century, Moroccan 
public health action had been expressed in different forms, ranging from govern-
ment participation in modern state-wide organs, such as the Sanitary Council of 
Tangiers, to popular rejection of foreign intervention. Most historiography on the 
French and Spanish Protectorates in Morocco has tended to ignore or underesti-
mate the development of the Moroccan state prior to and after 1912, though as it 
will be seen, Moroccan agency proved resilient and influenced public health 
developments in the Spanish and French Protectorates for many years after they 
were formally established. 
When this agency is systematically taken into account, the question of the 
colonial character of the Spanish (and French) Morocco’s health system arises. 
Many historians have argued that the Protectorate regime was only a façade for 
direct colonial action (Hoisington 1995; Rivet 1996; Gershovich 2000; Pennell 
2000; Villanova 2004). However, the impact of events taking place in Morocco 
was too strongly felt in metropolitan Spain (and France) to consider them as 
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“merely” colonial. Conversely, Spain (and France) had to display too much direct 
intervention to control Moroccan authorities and territory to describe their activi-
ties as “mere” colonization. In the case of Spain, it seems especially clear that 
differences were not of such a degree as to explain its relationship with Morocco 
in colonialist terms. Their interaction resembled more a conflict between countries 
of similar (weak) power: similarity led to war, not to colonization, and to expro-
priation or seizure of local authority, not to its intervention. An attempt will be 
made to clarify this crucial issue, although present conclusions cannot be but 
tentative, as they are based almost exclusively on Spanish and French sources. 
The main hypotheses may nevertheless be taken into consideration while the 
process of gathering data from Moroccan archives is carried out. Specific public 
health developments concerning the Jewish community are not addressed in this 
paper, an absence which should also be corrected in future works. 
Caring for the Ports and the Army 
Public Health and the State in 19th Century Morocco 
Did Moroccan Public Health Exist? 
In order to understand the weight of the Moroccan “factor” in the creation of 
dispensaries for natives in Spanish Morocco, it is first necessary to examine the 
trajectory of Morocco’s public health during the 19th century. In broad terms, the 
period 1822–1894 was an epoch of relative stability for the country, especially the 
last twenty years (Laroui 1993). Such stability, however, far from being static, 
was a fruit of a constant, tension-filled compromise between the numerous forces 
which operated on the Moroccan stage. Internally, the Sultan and the Makhzan 
(Moroccan government) interacted with local actors (caïds = governors, zawias = 
religious brotherhoods), social groups (ulamas = religious experts, commercial 
bourgeoisie, urban artisans) and certain territories (Rif, High Atlas, Saharan oasis) 
in order to reach some degree of cohesion for Moroccan society. Externally, the 
autonomy and sovereignty of Morocco evolved through relationships with several 
European and Western states as well as other Arab-Islamic countries (mainly the 
Ottoman Empire and Egypt) and with nearby colonies (French Algeria and 
Senegal), foreign enclaves (Spanish strongholds in the north and factories on the 
Saharan coast) and British Gibraltar. The international status quo on the so-called 
Moroccan question (parallel to other questions d’Orient such as the “Ottoman 
question” and the “Chinese question”) was maintained to some extent throughout 
the century. 
Out of this dynamic and troublesome balance, a number of administrative, eco-
nomic, military, institutional, legislative, cultural or political transformations 
materialised. However, they are usually interpreted as the outcomes of “informal” 
or direct imperialism exerted on the country, whose only chance was to resist and 
delay them as much as possible. But in accordance with authors such as Abdallah 
Laroui or Wielfried Rollman, it could be said that the role played by Moroccan 
authorities in those transformations seems more active than mere resistance. In the 
field of public health the following questions must be asked: what was Moroccan 
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in Morocco’s public health, if anything? And what were the effects of such 
“Moroccanness” in the health system, if any? Based upon this author’s PhD 
research (Martínez Antonio 2005a) it will be first argued that “Moroccanness” or 
Moroccan agency consisted of two coupled mechanisms of multiple diversifi-
cation and personal/oligarchic authoritarianism. On the one hand, attempts were 
made to keep unstoppable European intervention in matters of medicine and 
public health at bay by fostering participation of as many foreign countries as 
possible so that competition between them arose, along with a complication of 
administrative procedures. On the other hand, increasing internal fragmentation of 
Morocco’s health system was somewhat slowed down by an authoritarian concen-
tration of competencies in the hands of the Sultan and the Makhzan. In this way, 
sanitary measures could be taken and imposed without negotiation with social, 
local or territorial actors, while administrative procedures were eased. In sum, 
Moroccan weakness did not lead to dependence and anarchy in public health but 
rather to a kind of fragile autonomy. 
This particular Moroccan agency led, in the second place, to a predominance of 
the maritime and military components of the health system. In my opinion, health 
systems in the 19th century were generally composed of four branches (navy, 
army, maritime and land-based public health) or, in other words, they were con-
figured along a double civil-military and internal-external axis (Martinez Antonio 
2005). Maritime and army public health were prominent in Morocco because in 
both spheres a balance could be kept between international and Moroccan sanitary 
interests and also between the extension of the health system to a wider population 
and territory and the tendency of some localities to different degrees of self-
management. Such balances were not possible in navy and land public health, 
which suffered from a high degree of foreign dependence and internal heteroge-
neity. In some way, the first two branches tried to compensate the lacks of the 
latter, often assuming part of their competencies and tasks, though this did not 
mean that they succeeded in achieving their own goals. However, it seems certain 
that the most complex and comprehensive structures of Moroccan public health 
were those caring for the ports and the Army. 
This analysis can provide perspective on colonialist (and post-colonialist) 
accounts which have pictured the Moroccan authorities and people as having no 
interest in public health issues or merely resisting and conditioning imposed Euro-
pean initiatives in different ways. Colonialist accounts have promoted an unfair 
view of Morocco as a “medieval” country regarding health and medicine, reduced 
to a fossilised mosaic of classical Arabic medical institutions and practitioners, 
Muslim charity, folk healers and “superstitious” practices. All of these existed, of 
course, but so too did other more comprehensive and newly-created public health 
structures, whose existence was, at least in part, sought and enabled by the efforts 
of Moroccan authorities. On the other hand, it is also necessary to keep a distance 
from nationalist (and Islamist) historiographies which construct Moroccan medi-
cine as free from European influence and homogeneously based on the Arab 
tradition or which regard foreign influence just as an imposition. In general, it is 
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more useful to consider the differences between the history of public health in 
Morocco and in European countries as differences of degree and not of kind. On 
these conceptual grounds, a basic picture of the higher structures and most rele-
vant institutions of 19th century Moroccan public health are presented in the next 
two paragraphs. 
The Reigns of Moulay Abderrahman (1822–1859) and Sidi Mohammed IV (1859–
1873) 
An improved system of maritime public health began to be set up in Morocco 
during the reign of Sultan Moulay Abderrahman. The so-called International or 
Maritime Sanitary Council of Morocco, based in the port city of Tangier (also 
called the Council of Tangier), obtained a formal delegation of power from the 
Sultan (firman) in 1840 to “be responsible for the maintenance of public health on 
the Empire’s littoral, to elaborate all regulations and take all measures to carry out 
this purpose” (Raynaud 1900; El-Bezzaz 1982–1983). Though its precedents went 
back as far as 1792, the Sanitary Council of Tangier was essentially contemporary 
to others created in the main ports of the Arab-Islamic Mediterranean countries, 
such as Tunis (1835), Istanbul (1838–1839), Alexandria (1843) and Tripoli 
(Gallagher 1983; Panzac 1986; Schepin & Yermakov 1991; Moulin 1995; Mizrahi 
2003). In the following years, the Council improved its internal organisation 
through a permanent commission and a secretary. In addition, delegations were 
established in the other “imperial ports” (Tettouan, Larache, Rabat, Casablanca, 
Mazagan, Safi and Mogador) from 1846 on. Medical personnel was gradually 
attached to the Council, and revenues were raised by charging fees to ships for 
sanitary inspection. Finally, a provisional quarantine station was established on 
the isle of Mogador in 1865, so that pilgrims returning from Mecca could be 
isolated if cholera was suspected. 
It has usually been argued that the Council of Tangier was in fact a foreign 
institution, given that its members were the foreign diplomatic representatives in 
the city and its main budget was provided by foreign governments. Thus, its 
measures would have been dependent on the plans for foreign “penetration” in 
Morocco, the “civilisation” of the country, the promotion of European commercial 
exchanges and the protection of European communities in the port cities (Raynaud 
1900; El-Bezzaz 1982–1983). But this picture, though partly accurate, is 
nonetheless too reductionistic. To begin with, the Sultan had only “delegated” 
power in maritime health affairs to the Council, a precaution which would long be 
regretted by European representatives. For example, when it came to sensitive 
matters such as the control of maritime pilgrimage to Mecca, the Sultan often 
imposed his decisions upon the Council’s recommendations, because he still held 
executive power. Morocco also received foreign representation comprised of up to 
fourteen countries (Great Britain, France, Spain, Russia, Norway, Sweden, Portu-
gal, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria-Hungary, the United States, 
Italy and Germany) that were obligated to making equal economic contributions 
and to rotate among the posts periodically. Agreement was naturally difficult and 
the threat of one country’s imperialist interests being predominant was neutralised 
 185 
to a certain extent. Furthermore, in regard to pilgrimages to Mecca, the Sultan had 
appointed consuls (wakils) in Gibraltar, Tunis, Alexandria and Cairo, which 
probably allowed the Tangier Council to keep regular contact with its counterparts 
of those cities, as did the Council of Tunis (El-Bezzaz 1985; Gallagher 1983). 
Undoubtedly, cooperation with other Arab-Islamic countries was the most effec-
tive way of avoiding European inherence. 
On the other hand, a degree of direct control over the Council was exerted by 
Moroccan authorities through the naib, the Sultan’s official representative in 
Tangier since 1848, who acted as a de facto Minister of Foreign Affairs (Rollman 
1983; Pennell 2000). All the Council’s resolutions had to be submitted to his 
office, the Dar al-Niaba, and then sent to the Sultan for approval. This resulted in 
increased centralisation and co-ordination of maritime sanitary affairs throughout 
the country. Besides, slow and long official procedures could reduce the actual 
efficiency of European proposals when necessary. Finally, the naib could influ-
ence measures proposed by the Council so that they were not only of benefit to 
foreign residents and European commerce, but also to the fast-growing native 
population of port cities and to the new Moroccan commercial bourgeoisie. In the 
port cities, the caids and pachás were charged with controlling the Council’s dele-
gates and their approval was necessary for any measure taken in case of epide-
mics. 
The relative development of maritime public health in Morocco was used as a 
basis for proposing changes in land public health. In Tangier, the Council tried to 
extend its measures from the port to the city itself and also to support initiatives 
taken by civil doctors of the growing European community. It became common in 
this period for European settlers to propose sanitary reforms in case of epidemics 
of cholera or other diseases and to seek the support of the European consuls in the 
Council. A similar process occurred in the port cities (Raynaud 1902). However, 
the firman of 1840 had not allowed the extension of activities of the Council to-
wards urban public health. The risk was higher for Moroccan authorities in this 
field because the number of foreign countries would have been reduced and 
control over local authorities would have been more difficult to achieve. The same 
happened for European countries because they would have been obliged to in-
crease their expenses, competence between them would have increased and popu-
lar rejection of their influence would have been more serious. Therefore, no 
confluence of interests took place. On the one hand, Europeans attempted modest 
initiatives; on the other, traditional Moroccan institutions persisted. In Tangier and 
in the other ports, there existed urban assemblies composed of local authorities 
(caïd, pachá), merchants, ulama, doctors (tobba) and the market inspector 
(muhtasib) which had traditionally been in charge of proposing anti-epidemic 
measures. For example, in Tettouan during the plague epidemic of 1799–1800, 
“eminent city notables, including the ulama, decided that it was necessary to close 
the city gates so that it would be preserved from any contagion” (El-Bezzaz 
1985). The assemblies still kept some of their power during this period and were 
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also responsible for the good conditions of streets, buildings, slaughterhouses, the 
water supply and food sold in markets. In Tangier, for example, the muhtasib  
for cleaning the streets and squares, raised a little tax on the slaughtered cattle 
and directed a brigade of ten workers who swept the streets and gathered the 
litter, which they put on a limited number of donkeys to be taken to the 
orchards surrounding the city (Laredo 1994). 
Parallel to the Council of Tangier, the sultans Moulay Abdehrraman and Sidi 
Mohammed IV also started the transformation of military public health as part of 
their general reform of the Army (nizam al-askr) which followed Moroccan 
defeats against France (1844) and Spain (1860) (Rollman 1983). In this matter 
they followed the path established by the Ottoman Empire and Egypt (also by 
Tunis and by the army of the Algerian resistant, Abd al-Qadir). In the Ottoman 
Empire Sultan Mahmud II had created schools of military medicine and surgery in 
1827 and 1828 respectively, which were unified in the Imperial School of Medi-
cine (Mekteb-i Sahâne-i Tibbiye) in 1839, directed by the Austrian Dr. Bernard 
(Lewis 1984; Ishanoglu 1992; Panzac 1995). In Egypt Pasha Mehmet Ali had 
founded the School of Military Medicine at the Hospital Abu Zabal in Cairo in 
1826–1827, directed by the French doctor Antoine Barthèlemy Clot, also known 
as Clot Bey (Panzac 1989). 
Moroccan developments seem to have been much more modest than those in 
the Ottoman Empire and Egypt in this period, although further research is still 
needed on the subject. However, it is quite certain that Morocco contacted both 
countries in order to limit European influence in its military public health, as was 
the case for the maritime branch. Driss Mossaoui has shown that some Moroccan 
students were sent to study in the schools of Cairo and Istanbul during this period 
(Mossaoui 1995). They should have been attached to the new military regiments 
(‘askar), which increased from their original number of 900 to more than 3,000 
men in 1870. Moulay Abderrahman requested of Mehmet Ali that scientific and 
military works be translated into Arabic from European languages (mainly 
French), and a number of them could have been medical books, perhaps the same 
that Clot Bey had sent to Tunisian authorities in 1854 (Gallagher 1983). European 
influence in the Moroccan army medicine already existed in this period, though it 
was split between different countries. Since the end of the 18th century, it had been 
usual for Spanish military doctors, as well as naval surgeons from Gibraltar, to 
travel to Morocco at the request of the Sultan (Justel 1991). In 1861, a big supply 
of drugs that was probably addressed to the Army was acquired from France 
(Amster 2003). An important question which has not been systematically posed is 
the role of “renegades” (converts to Islam), especially of Spanish origin, as practi-
tioners in the Moroccan army. 
For most of this period, there was no formal Ministry of War. The katib al-jish 
(chief of the jish or guich regiments) remained the highest military officer, 
although in 1845 Moulay Abderrahman relied on his son, the future Sultan 
Mohammed VI, for directly supervising and fostering the modernisation of the 
army. It was in the first years of his reign that Sidi Mohammed created the post of 
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wazir al-harb or Minister of War (Rollman 1983). Greater military centralisation 
was then achieved, and it went along with a more permanent organisation of the 
army throughout the country, because askaris were distributed in the Sultan’s 
guard and in garrisons in the main cities. These developments should have 
affected sanitary and medical structures as well, in the sense of a greater control 
by central authorities, although there is a lack of specific data about this issue. In 
addition, it seems plausible that Moroccan military doctors did not enjoy much 
executive power compared with their military chiefs, as this was also true in most 
European armies. This consultative character limited the extent of European inter-
ventions in military public health, as was the case with the Sanitary Council of 
Tangier. Finally, the army tried to be used as basis for extending reforms to land 
public health. A clear example is that the army was usually charged with imple-
menting “sanitary cordons” around cities or areas in case of epidemics (Raynaud 
1902). However, results were quite modest. 
The Reigns of Moulay Hassan I (1873–1894) and Moulay Abd el-Aziz (1894–
1906) 
During the reigns of Moulay Hassan I and Moulay Abd el-Aziz, maritime and 
military public health continued to be predominant in Morocco and their develop-
ment was achieved by similar mechanisms as in previous decades. However, 
Morocco’s “sanitary autonomy” in the international context and “sanitary cohe-
sion” inside the country became more and more precarious from the 1880s on-
ward. By then, Western health systems were swiftly moving to a new basis. The 
former system of quarantines, sanitary cordons, sanitation and disinfection had 
been mainly consultative in character. It had concentrated its activity on tempo-
rary epidemic outbreaks and had relied on contagionist or miasmatic interpreta-
tions of disease. This system started to give way to one of inspection, which was 
based on a permanent health administration, where the increasing executive power 
of doctors was displayed through new institutions such as laboratories and suppor-
ted by the new scientific doctrines of bacteriology and experimental hygiene 
(Rosen 1958; Porter 1994, 1999). Moroccan authorities were interested in these 
new developments, but were also aware that they enabled a greater degree of 
European intervention in the country’s public health which risked eroding the 
cohesion of traditional public health structures and the support of practitioners and 
people alike. 
In maritime public health, for example, European doctors played an increasing 
role in the Sanitary Council of Tangier. “Medical advisors” had begun to be 
appointed regularly from the 1860s onward, mainly in Tangier, and the consuls 
relied more and more on their technical expertise. For example, they assumed the 
sanitary inspection of the port of Tangier and elaborated the Council’s quarantine 
regulation, approved in 1878. In the beginning these doctors were private practi-
tioners working for the European communities but, for example, from 1885 on-
ward, Spain officially attached doctors to its Moroccan consulates (Felipe Ovilo, 
Enrique Rebolledo, Severo Cenarro and Antonio Jordán among others). European 
doctors were also appointed to the Mogador lazaret so that they directly 
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supervised the quarantine of Mecca pilgrims. The Spanish doctors Cenarro and 
Rebolledo assumed this task in the 1890s, although still under strict control of the 
Moroccan authorities. In 1900, under the increasing menace of a plague outbreak 
similar to the one that had affected Porto in 1899, the French doctor based in 
Algiers, Louis Raynaud, was recruited by the Sultan for that mission. Once he had 
reorganised the lazaret in 1901, he appointed another Algiers health officer, Dr. 
Gagé, and a Council medical advisor to supervise the quarantine under his instruc-
tions (Raynaud 1902). 
It was following doctors’ suggestions that the European consuls systematically 
pressed the Moroccan government to have the Mogador lazaret organised on a 
more permanent and scientific basis. They also counted on the force of agree-
ments reached at the International Sanitary Conferences of Dresden (1894) and 
Venice (1897). For example, the second article of the Venice Sanitary Convention 
stated: 
It will be recommended to the competent authorities in Morocco to implement, 
in the country’s ports, measures in harmony with those stated in the general 
[international] sanitary regulations, in order to prevent the invasion and diffu-
sion of plague. 
The distant placement in Mogador and the inadequacy of its building and equip-
ment never fully satisfied Europeans. Dr. Enrique Rebolledo was the first to make 
a report suggesting the need for creating a new lazaret. Soon after his arrival, Dr. 
Louis Raynaud sent a new report to the Council and to Moroccan authorities 
proposing the establishment of a lazaret definitif in Tangier, the ten-mile distant 
Punta Malabata being regarded as an ideal setting (Raynaud 1902). It was not 
until 1909 that an international commission was appointed to study the exact loca-
tion and characteristics of the future lazaret, although it was probably never built 
(Laredo 1994). 
The creation of a modern lazaret was a main concern of the Tangier Sanitary 
Council, but new public health developments spoke less for this kind of institution 
than for a permanent health administration in the port cities. By means of such 
administration the hygienic conditions of streets and buildings, slaughterhouses, 
sewage systems, water systems or garbage removal could be controlled in order to 
improve the general urban health status, thereby strengthening the city’s defences 
in case of epidemics. In this sense, the Council succeeded in supporting the 
creation of the Hygiene and Sanitary Commission in Tangier in 1892 (with a brief 
predecessor in 1884) based upon a formal delegation from the Sultan to the 
Council of the responsibility “for assuming the cleansing of the city of Tangier, 
the street paving and the repairing and building of sewage collectors” (Marco 
1913). Although this measure could not be extended to other port cities, the new 
commission and the lazaret project served as arguments for European consuls to 
propose a reorganisation of the Council in 1899 so that it truly acted as a perma-
nent maritime health “service”, that is, was given real executive powers. 
In general all these new transformations in maritime public health ran strongly 
against Moroccan interests because they tended to shift executive power in health 
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affairs into the hands of foreign technical experts which the country could not 
provide itself (or, at least, not in sufficient numbers). However, Moroccan autho-
rities strived to keep their agency in sanitary affairs. For example, the centralising 
role of the naib was assumed by the new Ministry of Foreign Affairs because 
“daily contact with the consuls had allowed him [the naib] to take on more and 
more power” and to pursue his own particular interests (Pennell 2000). On the 
other hand, Moulay Hassan re-confirmed the 1840 “delegation” to the Council by 
means of a new dahir (official decree) in 1879, thus keeping his personal autho-
rity in sanitary affairs. Dr. Raynaud complained that the dahir kept on restricting 
the Council’s jurisdiction, allowing it only “to admit or reject the ships arriving 
from the ports of the Empire, to put them in quarantine and fix its duration accor-
ding to the regulations of sanitary affairs”. Thus, the Council’s action remained 
“exclusively limited to the sea and not to land” (Raynaud 1902). 
Impotence caused despair and, sometimes, rage in European representatives. An 
1899 memorandum of the Sanitary Council complained about the “almost insur-
mountable obstacles, which render its aims and its deliberations useless”. The 
memorandum continued:  
The Makhzan will not modernise itself, the Moroccan statesman in power is 
not sensitive to the best intentioned and most disinterested advice. The axiom 
which has been confirmed up to now, that ‘the Sanitary Council is but an 
organ of the Sultan’, who has the power to sanction or reject any agreed reso-
lution, not only avoids consequently any fertile activity, but casts a doubt over 
its own right of existence. 
Moroccan authorities also managed to slow down the creation of the Hygiene 
Commission of Tangier and later to exert significant control over it. Until 1903, 
the Commission remained mainly a private initiative of local European doctors. 
Only then, an organic regulation was approved and European consuls participated 
for the first time in its sessions (Marco 1913). The 1879 dahir made it difficult for 
the Commission to count on the Council’s support, while the persistence of local 
functionaries, such as the muhtasib, did much to discourage its work. In the words 
of their members themselves, the first attempt to create it in 1884 failed because  
[...] the muhtasib and his personnel first, the administrator of Sultan’s proper-
ties and the different market members, the nadir or administrator of the 
Mosque’s properties, the select Israelite board, the governor and his Khalifa, 
all in one word conspired against the existence of the Commission [...] (Marco 
1913). 
Finally, institutions most representative of the new “hygienist” model of European 
public health, such as disinfection stations or bacteriological/analytical laborato-
ries, had to wait longer to be created. Only after the Protectorate regime was 
established in 1912 could the French Pasteur Institute and a Spanish Laboratory 
start their activities in Tangier. 
Nevertheless, in spite of Moroccan efforts, the number of foreign countries with 
actual weight in maritime public health affairs shrank to France, Great Britain, 
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Spain and perhaps Germany. The connection of Dr. Raynaud and Dr. Gagé with 
French Algeria revealed that French expansionism in the Maghreb was severely 
threatening Morocco. For Spain, doctors Felipe Ovilo and Enrique Rebolledo 
achieved significant influence due to their role as medical advisors of the Council, 
and the same could be said of Severo Cenarro, strongly committed to the Hygiene 
Commission until his death in 1898. Great Britain reinforced its involvement, 
always relying on its commercial and naval power and on the links with Gibraltar, 
while Germany’s influence was mainly felt at the turn of the century. This fact, 
combined with the loss of contacts with other Arab-Islamic countries, revealed a 
stronger and more incisive European influence on Moroccan maritime public 
health. 
On the other hand, Hassan I continued the process of transformation of the 
Moroccan army begun by his father and his grandfather. Military public health 
was not an exception. A medical student, Abd al-Salam al-‘Alami, was sent to the 
School of Military Medicine Qasr al-Aini in Cairo to become a military doctor, as 
others had been before him (Mossaoui & Roux Dessarps 1992; Amster 2003). 
However, initiatives under the influence of European countries became predomi-
nant in this period over collaboration with other Arab-Islamic countries. In 1886, 
an School of Military Medicine was created at Tangier under the direction of the 
Spanish Army doctor Felipe Ovilo Canales, that functioned until 1899 (Martínez 
Antonio 2005c). At least twelve Moroccan students are recorded as having started 
a two-year course focused on anatomy and therapeutics and complemented by 
practical clinical and surgical assistance under surveillance of Drs. Ovilo and 
Cenarro in the attached dispensary that was founded the same year. Some of them 
did not complete their studies for several reasons, but others such as Mustapha 
Essandi, Hamed Romani and Mohammed Dukaly, whom Ovilo soon began to 
treat as “disciples”, prolonged their training. They even travelled to Spain in 1888 
to pass university exams and to become acquainted with Madrid’s main research 
and clinical centres. 
Ovilo’s pupils soon participated in harkas (minor armed expeditions) sent by 
the Sultan to punish northern qabilas, as Si Ahmed Temsamami did in Boccoia in 
1896. According to Ellen Amster, he  
was designated by the Makhzan military doctor attached to the expedition of 
Moulay Abdesselam el Mrani, of Ben el Bagdadi and of Mahboub, where he 
fulfilled his role using European methods (Amster 2003).  
Felipe Ovilo himself was appointed chief of the health services of the harka sent 
against the qabila of Anghera in 1892. A project to establish a military hospital in 
Tangier was also foreseen in connection with the school, the Spanish Dispensary 
being the first step in its realisation. But “the first Muslim Hospital to be created 
in Morocco for centuries” was not finally created. However, the Spanish Dispen-
sary, as well as the English Mission Hospital and the French Hospital in Tangier, 
assisted Moroccan troops on several occasions and served then as part-time mili-
tary hospitals. 
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France also became strongly involved in Moroccan military public health and 
managed to achieve a privileged position among other European countries. Dr. 
Fernand Linarès, a member of the French Military Mission in Morocco (sent in 
1877 under the direction of Jules Erckman), entered the personal service of the 
Sultan in Fez from 1882 onward and accompanied him on different occasions, for 
example, in the mhalla to Tafilalet in 1893. Linarès became a key agent for 
French policy in Morocco during his long stay in the country (1877–1902). His 
influence upon the Sultan and the Makhzan was strongly felt, and it was most 
probably at his suggestion that the new Sultan Moulay Abd el-Aziz, de facto his 
Grand Vizir and regent Ba Ahmed (1894–1901), decided to take Arab graduates 
from the School of Medicine of Algiers for the army service (Amster 2003). 
Through Linarès, France became the main foreign influence in Moroccan military 
public health. His role was much more decisive than that of other European 
doctors formally attached to the court, such as Dr. Adolfo Ladrón de Guevara 
(1889–1892 and 1894–1897), who could never achieve significant influence 
(Rollman 1983). Finally, a number of the military officers periodically sent to 
Gibraltar by Hassan I were trained as “medics” for service in the askar regiments 
(Rollman 1983). Purchase of medical equipment or products as well as the 
sending of students to military schools of medicine in Europe or America have not 
yet been confirmed, but should not be discarded as possibilities, given that other 
countries were still involved in different ways in Moroccan military reforms 
during this period (Pennell 2000). 
Moroccan authorities managed to keep a degree of control over these initiatives 
which tended to take military public health out of their hands. For example, 
centralisation of military affairs was reinforced by Hassan I through the strengthe-
ning of the Ministry of War (wazir al-harb). The Sultan also succeeded in keeping 
European military doctors far from him and the central Makhzan for some periods. 
Adolfo Ladrón de Guevara was usually confined to the area of Tettouan and 
Tangier, as were the other members of the tiny Spanish Military Mission in 
Morocco. Felipe Ovilo, due to his work at the School of Medicine, remained most 
of the time in Tangier, even if he met Hassan I there in 1889 and participated in 
Spanish embassies to Rabat in 1887 and to Marrakech in 1894. Dr. Linarès was 
already in Morocco in 1877, but it was only from 1882 onward that he could settle 
in Fez as the Sultan’s personal physician. Besides, he could not accompany the 
Sultan in all his mhallas, as he did, for example, in 1893. European military 
doctors were also assigned to different branches of the Moroccan Army, so that 
their influence was diversified. Finally, the School of Tangier was only officially 
recognised when the Sultan visited Tangier in 1889. It was the Moroccan govern-
ment which paid the students a grant and gave them an “annual suit”, thus keeping 
them under its control, although more important in this regard was that these 
school-educated military doctors were themselves Moroccan. Control of this 
institution was so significant that, in 1899 the Spanish Minister in Tangier com-
plained that 
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the Makhzan and the Moors in general think that its creation and tolerance [of 
the school] are signs of excessive benevolence towards Spain, which they tend 
to correct from time to time with a systematic opposition and intransigence 
[...]. Thus, instead of diffusing Spanish influence in the Empire, this Legation 
is obliged to spend what it has in periodic begging and supplications to the 
Makhzan so that the students are given the modest grant and the annual suit 
that were fixed by the deceased Sultan. 
The last quarter of the 19th century thus saw the situation of Moroccan public 
health worsen. In comparison with the middle decades of the century, there were 
no dramatic events as the wars with France and Spain but new developments in 
international public health pushed Morocco’s health system to its limits. 
Exchanges with other Arab-Islamic countries virtually ceased; the number of 
European countries with decisive influence shrank; central authority moved to the 
very person of the Sultan; and local resistance grew stronger. Instead of allowing 
controllable changes, the Moroccan tactic gradually shifted to avoiding any 
change at all, as almost all helped undermine its interests. This policy of “obstruc-
tion” was stigmatised by foreign representatives although it continued to be a 
form of Moroccan agency to their profound despair. 
Between Makzhan and Siba. Provincial and Local Public Health in Northern 
Morocco at the End of the 19th Century 
Thus far a brief sketch has been drawn of the central (or state) level of the public 
health framework as it was configured in Morocco during the 19th century. An 
attempt has been made to show how Moroccan agency acted at this level by 
fostering diversification of the inevitable Western influence and authoritarian 
concentration of power in the hands of the Sultan and his central Makhzan. It has 
also been shown how this agency resulted in the preferential transformation of the 
maritime and military branches of Morocco’s health system, in contrast to much 
weaker public health changes in naval and land public health. However, if the 
creation of dispensaries in Spanish Morocco is to be understood, lower levels of 
Moroccan public health must be also analysed. The north of the country has been 
chosen for this examination because it will increase the focus on the future 
Spanish “zone of influence”, actually the main interest of this study. However, 
this analysis could be applied to Morocco as a whole. Instead of the whole 19th 
century, just the final decades will be studied. 
To speak of public health levels means that in the usually alleged breach be-
tween bilad al-Makzhzan (government controlled areas) and bilad al-Siba 
(autonomous areas only recognising the Sultan as spiritual leader) or between the 
cities and the countryside in Morocco, there existed in fact an articulated chain of 
administrative, institutional or political organisms and authorities – no matter how 
thin it might have been. Even if this chain did not reach a significant part of 
Morocco’s population and territory, it showed the existence of a Moroccan public 
health system broader than most descriptions account for. This study shows that 
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there were four levels – the Sultan-central Makhzan, provincial, local, and the siba 
– the latter being in fact the limit of reach and showing particular characteristics. 
This general framework proved to be resilient, having an undeniable impact on the 
French and Spanish Protectorates when they began to be established in 1912. At 
all four levels, diversification and authoritarianism, as well as predominance of 
military and maritime public health prolonged themselves, though this kind of 
“fractality” was expressed in particular developments at every level. 
The “Provincial” Level: Tangier 
In northern Morocco, a number of loosely defined provinces, whose centres were 
cities such as Tangier, Fez, Oujda or Ouazzane, were defined in the second half of 
the 19th century. In Tangier, provincial power crystallised around the naib. This 
post was transformed from a de facto minister of Foreign Affairs into a functio-
nary subordinated to the actual minister established by Hassan I in 1879 because 
he pursued his own interests more than those of the Sultan (Pennell 2000). How-
ever, this change was not so clear, as nothing was in the city of the Strait, and the 
naib actually stood at an intermediate position between the wazirs (ministers) of 
the central Makhzan and local officers such as the caid (military governor) and the 
pachá (civil governor). The post had been “provincialized” because it could no 
longer have a state-wide influence but it became (and was tolerated as) the “hand” 
of the Sultan for everything occurring between Tangier and Melilla (Zaim 1988). 
It is not strange that the post became a virtual monopoly of two important families 
of Andalusian descent of Northern Morocco, first through Mohammed Bargach of 
Salé (1860–1886) and later through Mohammed Torres of Tettouan (1886–1908). 
In the same period, and not by chance, the position of foreign consuls in 
Tangier in relation to their metropolitan governments’ activities in Morocco 
changed as well. For many decades the main foreign actors in Morocco, the 
Tangier consuls began to lose their primacy by the last quarter of the 19th century. 
European governments managed to directly reach the Sultan, either by more and 
more frequent embassies, or by permanent missions settled in port cities or in any 
of the imperial capitals – Fez, Marrakesh, Meknes and Rabat. Those new 
representatives assumed the main role in the policy of “peaceful penetration” and 
“civilisation” displayed in the Moroccan administration. The cases of Harry 
MacLean or Fernand Linarès are most representative of this shift (Des Cilleuls 
1959; Pennell 2000). Tangier’s consuls became increasingly “provincialized” and 
their activities were more and more confined to the north of the country. 
This provincialization of the naib and the foreign representatives was also 
reflected in public health. In the case of maritime public health, the Sanitary 
Council of Tangier remained a state-wide organism but new developments were 
increasingly achieved through direct contacts of European representatives with the 
Sultan and central Makhzan. For example, the 1892 “delegation” of Hassan I that 
allowed the creation of the Hygiene Commission was a result of the embassy of 
the French Consul, Count of Auvigni, to the court (Marco 1913). The Council 
could but acknowledge the “sterility of its efforts to veil for Europe’s public 
health” because it worked “as an organ of the Sultan and needs the sovereign 
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sanction to make agreements effective.” The appointment of Dr. Raynaud in 1900 
was probably made directly by the Sultan after a suggestion from Dr. Linarès. 
The project of the quarantine station in Tangier reflected very clearly the 
ambiguity of the Council as a vehicle of state and provincial interests at the same 
time, an ambiguity that may have influenced its final failure. On the one hand, the 
new location was favourable for Tangerian notables (the naib – first and foremost) 
and the merchants of Tettouan and Larache who worried about the sanitary 
dangers associated with their growing commerce with Spain or France. Spanish 
commerce with Morocco focused also in practice on the northern area of the 
country as reflected in the establishment of regular sea connections by the Com-
pañía Transatlántica in 1887, whereby Tangier occupied the central position 
(geographic and economic) in the traffic between Cádiz, Málaga and Barcelona in 
Spain and Rabat, Mazagan and Mogador in Morocco (Rodrigo 2002). The 
Spanish population in Tangier rose to 6,000, by far the largest European commu-
nity in the city, and Spaniards were also predominant in Tettouan. The Spanish 
Legation in Tangier had accordingly a growing interest in protecting the southern 
shores of the Iberian peninsular and Spanish citizens in those cities rather than 
Morocco’s littoral as a whole. On the other hand, Tangier was also a more ade-
quate location than Mogador for controlling maritime health in rapidly developing 
ports such as Casablanca and Rabat, where Makhzan and French interests were 
predominant. Finally, the Sultan and Great Britain were interested in maintaining 
the Council as a guarantee against any dismemberment of Moroccan public health 
and as a guarantee of persisting influence due to the proximity of Gibraltar. 
In military public health, the School of Military Medicine is most representative 
of the increasing provincial detour of Tangerian actors. During his visit to Tangier 
in 1889, Hassan I issued a dahir by which he compromised by recruiting students 
for the school from throughout Morocco, but, in practice, future doctors continued 
to be mostly, if not exclusively, Tangerians. Dr. Felipe Ovilo confirmed this in 
1891: 
On occasion of the great Muslim feast of Aid Seguer, the pupils of this School 
of Medicine, supported by His Shariffian Majesty, marched for the first time 
grouped and uniformed, taking their place in the military ranks that accom-
panied the Governor of Tangier. This fact has had the strongest effect on the 
authorities and the Moorish people, even more as they are sons of this city, 
who by order of His Shariffian Majesty have been chosen as the future doctors 
of the Moroccan Army (Lourido Díaz 1996). 
It was also very significant that on the occasion of Hassan I’s audience with Dr. 
Felipe Ovilo in 1889 in Tangier, the Sultan was accompanied by his Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Si Fedul Garnitt, and not by the naib, Mohammed Torres, who 
had been directly involved in the creation of the medical school through his 
contacts with Spanish representatives. In a way, the Sultan was trying to reaffirm 
his control over the initiative and that of his minister. Nevertheless, he failed and 
Torres’s interests prevailed. Pupils were recruited from good families of the city 
(Temsamami, Dukkali) and were nominated or at least approved by him, as he 
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was in the position of “dispensing favours” to local notables, therefore reinforcing 
both his position and theirs. 
Another relevant sign of provincialization was that the school’s doctors were 
sent mostly, if not exclusively, to serve in military expeditions taking place on the 
northern fringe of the country. These became very frequent and included, for 
example, those against the Anghera in 1892, the Ibuqquyen in 1889, 1896 and 
1898, and the Guelaia in 1880 and 1893–1894 (Pennell 2000). Most of these were 
not mhallas commanded by the Sultan, but smaller harkas led by Sultan’s 
relatives, such as Prince Moulay Arafa or Prince Moulay Bu Beker and accom-
panied by secondary Makhzan authorities, local caïds and military chiefs. In the 
case of Anghera, the harka was completely organized from Tangier. In the other 
cases, there was usually co-operation between Tangier, which sent troops by sea 
to disembark in Melilla and move to the hinterland, and Tadla, Oujda or even Fez, 
which sent troops by land. To sum it up, Tangerian military doctors acted regio-
nally in a defined area of the country, while, in contrast, Algerian doctors re-
cruited by Ba Ahmed at the suggestion of Fernand Linarès probably acted in a 
wider territory. 
Similarly, the Spanish Legation and, in general, all Spanish representatives in 
Tangier pressed for the school to be created in this city and not in Ceuta, where 
the Spanish government had been thinking of establishing several institutions in 
the 1880s. The failure of the Spanish Military Mission in Morocco, which had its 
base in Ceuta and Tettouan, may also be explained by the lack of support from 
Spanish representatives in Tangier. In this way, these Tangier residents retained 
their power even if they could no longer act on a general Moroccan level and 
limited themselves to contacts with the naib and local notables. Provincialization 
resulted in Spain finding it increasingly hard to reach the Sultan and have a signi-
ficant impact on Morocco’s general public health. 
In summary, the provincial level of Moroccan public health essentially repro-
duced the characteristics of the state level, though through different actors. The 
naib and the consuls became subordinated to the Makhzan and foreign embassies 
or missions, though they retained a degree of autonomy. Some periodical efforts 
were made to control this situation but, in general, autonomy posed no serious 
threat because regional actors did not intend to question higher authorities, and 
these, in turn, let them act with relative freedom for their interests. The project of 
the quarantine station in Tangier and especially the creation of the School of 
Medicine in this city reflected the increasing provincial detour of Tangerian initia-
tives. 
The Local Level: Anghera and Guelaia 
If most analyses tend to subsume the provincial level into the central Moroccan 
government, the local level is usually reduced to the siba. It is true that in the 
second half of the 19th century, it became increasingly difficult for the Sultan and 
for Tangier authorities to keep qabilas such as Anghera and Guelaia under 
control. For the first time, local leaders managed to concentrate power in whole 
qabilas (or in most of their fractions) and managed to act on their own, often 
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creating problems to the Sultan and Makhzan. The difference with the provincial 
level was that local autonomy posed a much more serious danger. Whether they 
set up irregular forces to defend their territory from European expansionism, orga-
nised seasonal migration to nearby European enclaves and colonies, or engaged in 
smuggling, local leaders threatened the Sultan’s authority and legitimacy. None-
theless, what they actually intended was to assume functions of defence and 
organisation that they considered the Sultan was unable to render in their areas. 
This fact connected them, though weakly, with the rest of Moroccan structures. 
In addition, Moroccan central and regional authorities managed to neutralize 
local autonomy to a certain extent by using authoritarian measures supported by 
strong use of force, either military or diplomatic. For example, it has already been 
mentioned that harkas were periodically sent from the 1880s on to control the 
above mentioned qabilas. As a result, more or less strong garrisons under the 
command of caids were established in the vicinity of Ceuta (Anghera) and in 
Silwan (close to Melilla) (Pennell 2000). Their missions included preventing 
armed incidents with Spanish enclaves, preventing qabilians from settling and 
cultivating neutral land around Ceuta and Melilla, regulating commercial ex-
changes through customs, and controlling migration to European enclaves and 
colonies. In the course of time, garrisons tended to become disorganised and new 
local leaders turned again to concentrate power. However, when armed incidents 
re-appeared or denunciations of smuggling were made by European countries, 
new expeditions were sent which either re-established the garrisons and dissuaded 
the qabilians or repressed them. On the other hand, the Sultan managed to keep on 
acting as the exclusive representative of Moroccan interests, preventing local 
leaders from participating in international negotiations such as the Spanish-
Moroccan Treaty of 1894 which followed the armed clashes between the Guelaia 
and the Spanish military units in Melilla. 
Changes in the northern qabilas were paralleled by those in nearby European 
enclaves and colonies, which also became increasingly autonomous from the 
metropolitan governments and their higher representatives in Morocco. In the case 
of the Spanish enclaves, for example, the military authorities in Ceuta and Melilla 
became officially or de facto separated from the Commandant Generalships of 
Andalusia and Granada in the last quarter of the 19th century. There was little 
coordination with the Spanish representatives in Tangier, a lack of communication 
that resulted in local military authorities developing an increasing mentality of 
expansion which did not fit well with the Spanish status quo policy towards 
Morocco. In addition, smuggling of products (guns included) accounted for a 
significant percentage of the enclaves’ otherwise restricted economy and the 
creation of military units composed of qabilians (Compañía de Moros Tiradores 
del Rif in Melilla in 1859, which was transformed into the Milicia Voluntaria de 
Ceuta in 1895) was fostered (Arqués & Gibert 1992). The armed conflict near 
Melilla in 1893–1894 was triggered by the construction of a new post in the 
campo that had been ordered by the Military Governor, General Margallo, who 
was killed by Riffians in the course of combat. Similar developments were taking 
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place in the French Algerian region of South Oranais, where, for example, mili-
tary officers often decided on their own new operations or advances into the 
Moroccan-Algerian border zone.  
In other words, European enclaves and colonies tried to pursue expansionist 
objectives that they thought their governments were not implementing as they 
should. Increasing autonomy posed a more serious threat for metropolitan govern-
ments than the autonomy of the Tangier consuls. In the case of Spain, the 
enclaves’ aggressive initiatives could potentially cause the failure of the politics of 
status quo and “peaceful penetration” by forcing Morocco first to limit Spanish 
activities and second to grant new privileges to other European representatives 
after the inevitable protests. Thus, Spain tried to reinforce coordination of the 
enclaves with its general policy in Morocco by developing their military admini-
stration and institutions, by establishing duty-free ports or by creating customs. 
These measures could not prevent periodic armed incidents or smuggling but at 
least reduced them. As it is seen, both Morocco and Spain tried to keep local 
actors under control, even if Moroccan measures were more drastic than those in 
the Spanish enclaves. 
All these events were also reflected in public health. At the local level, foreign 
intervention was clearer. For example, Eastern Riffian seasonal migration to agri-
cultural complexes in French Algeria intensified in the second half of the 19th 
century. There were two main itineraries: by sea, through the port of Melilla to-
wards the ports of Oran and Nemours or by land, through the frontier adjoining 
Oran province. Migration involved thousands of Riffians every summer, with the 
consequent danger of spreading epidemics. That is why, for example, French 
Algerian health authorities began to take measures concerning migrants, such as 
compulsory smallpox vaccination and disinfection of ships and personal effects, 
which enhanced the development of their maritime public health services. On the 
other hand, increasing regulation of commerce between the Spanish enclaves and 
Oran province, on one side, and the nearby qabilas, on the other, led to the estab-
lishment of customs by the Europeans, as in Melilla from 1867 on (Zaim 1988). 
Commerce regulation improved sanitary control because, for example, the market-
place was located outside the town, in the campo, preventing qabilians from 
reaching the city and Spaniards from travelling to the countryside. Other measures 
for qabilians, such as smallpox vaccination, may also have been used. 
Military public health followed a similar path. This period saw an increase of 
Spanish garrisons and also of the units of Riffians under Spanish command 
(Milicia Voluntaria de Ceuta). Accordingly, from the middle of the 1880s, the 
Spanish government had decided to improve the military hospitals in the area so 
that they had better facilities and equipment, more personnel and larger capacity. 
The hospitals of Ceuta and Melilla increased in size to 200 beds, while in the 
Peñón de Alhucemas, Peñón de Vélez and Chafarinas Islands, there were 50 
places (Larra 1900). But these institutions also had the purpose of “attraction” for 
nearby qabilas. According to the military doctor Ángel de Larra Cerezo, more 
than one thousand Riffians had been assisted in those hospitals between 1885 and 
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1900, a number that included not only civilians but also, for example, “100 
Riffians” who had fought against Melilla troops in 1893–1894 (Larra 1900). In 
fact, assistance to Riffian combatants, either involved in clashes against Spaniards 
or inside their qabilas, seemed to be very frequent, because Larra confirmed that 
in the military hospitals “the Moors cured of serious wounds and operated on are 
very numerous” (Larra 1900). Smallpox vaccination may also have been done on 
Riffians. Besides, Spanish Army doctors travelled from time to time to the 
“Moorish camp” to carry out surgical operations or provide clinical care to local 
notables, though “the risk for their lives” limited this measure to isolated cases. 
Similar developments, though surely on a larger scale, may have taken place in 
the region bordering on French Algeria. 
For Morocco, these facts implied a severe threat to its control over local public 
health. Though some degree of control could be achieved, the local agency of the 
qabilas could not be completely channelled. In maritime public health, the fact 
that migrants followed different routes reveals the attempt to avoid Makhzan 
control, as well as dependency exclusively on one European enclave or colony 
and therefore a form of diversification. The same could be said for commerce. 
Local leaders of qabilas sought to acquire some control over the flux of migrants 
and products, so that they could benefit most from them and reinforce their autho-
rity. Clandestine migration and smuggling also provided a means of thwarting the 
effectiveness of Spanish and French sanitary measures, as well as Makhzan 
control. In this context, official harkas sent to Anghera and Guelaia systematically 
tried to ensure legal commerce of these qabilas with nearby enclaves. Fighting 
against smuggling was an indirect means of achieving more “sanitary security”, 
and it is not strange that the Sanitary Council of Tangier considered it a priority 
for avoiding the risk of epidemics. Morocco also interacted with competence be-
tween the Spanish enclaves and French Algeria in the area. 
In military public health, qabilas’ agency was again not absent and was re-
flected first in travels to both Spanish and French military hospitals in order to 
avoid dependency on one or the other. Smuggling of drugs and medical material 
with foreign enclaves should not be discarded. Local leaders could also severely 
hinder sanitary measures by launching hostilities which prevented people or 
combatants from travelling to the enclaves. Moroccan central and regional 
authorities tried to ensure control through the military doctors sent to these areas 
as part of the harkas. These were mainly the doctors trained in the School of 
Tangier, although, as mentioned earlier, Felipe Ovilo himself participated in the 
expedition to Anghera in 1892. It is possible that these doctors offered their 
services to the Riffians and Jbalians immediately after the fighting, but we do not 
know if any of them remained in the garrisons for a more prolonged time. 
Algerian doctors recruited through French influence could also have a role in the 
region, thus allowing Morocco not to depend exclusively on one country. 
The bilad al-siba: Ibuqquyen 
Beyond the local level, the analysis of Moroccan public health becomes even 
more complex. In the Tangier province, qabilas such as Ibuqquyen, Ait Warya-
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ghar, Beni Arus, Ait Said or Ajmás, in fact, up to two thirds of the future Spanish 
Protectorate, were only linked to the system described here too loosely to properly 
become a part of it. Structurally, this happened mainly because these qabilas did 
not manage to act collectively externally and establish a single authority inter-
nally. This fact prevented them from having a collective link within the chain of 
Moroccan power and to interact collectively with European countries, represen-
tatives, colonies or enclaves. It is a matter here of a “microscopic” dimension of 
society – fractions, sub-fractions, clans – which have usually been analysed with 
the help of anthropological concepts by a long list of anthropologists of Moroccan 
society, such as Robert Montagne, Ernst Gellner, David M. Hart, David Seddon or 
Henry Munson Jr. 
However, this shift from historical to anthropological analysis should not be 
overemphasized. If applying the term “public health” at this level may seem 
excessive, there existed nonetheless health structures to meet the care needs of 
groups of people – even if their complexity was very small. Apparently, events 
seemed to be confined within qabilas, conveying a sense of isolation and frag-
mentation. But it could be said that transformations taking place at this level were 
a simplified version of those occurring in Anghera and Guelaia and, therefore, 
parallel to the general changes in the rest of Moroccan public health. This meant 
nonetheless a higher degree of autonomy in the face of Moroccan and European 
central, provincial and local authorities, that was very close to virtual inde-
pendence. This was reflected in the very slow pace of maritime and military 
developments in comparison with traditional importance of “naval” and civil inte-
rests. 
In the last decade of the 19th century, the qabila of Ibuqquyen, located in the 
central Rif, provided a most representative example of developments found in the 
area. Ibuqquyen armed activities still seemed to focus mainly on the coastline and 
the sea. The particular balance of European naval power in the Eastern Medi-
terranean and the almost non-existence of the Moroccoan Navy allowed local 
fishermen to engage in gun smuggling with the Spanish enclaves of Peñón de 
Vélez and Peñón de Alhucemas and, more important, directly with foreign ships 
sailing near the coast. Smuggling was so widespread that by 1889 more than 
50,000 guns a year were being sold on the whole Rif coast (Pennell 2000). It was 
this combination of guns and sea skills which led to “piratical” actions, that is, 
modest naval activities (in the sense of a military navy). In Ibuqquyen, small boats 
(carabos) manned with a bunch of armed qabilians or simply armed men hidden 
on the coast were able to create a sustained series of incidents with foreign ships 
from the 1880s on, with their cargo being confiscated, their crews, ransomed or 
the ships sunk. It is probable that some of these incidents were triggered by Euro-
peans not respecting smuggling deals (exchange of foodstuff, skins or wax for 
guns and products) and showed that qabilians were able to ensure their position to 
a certain extent in front of abuses. Smuggling and other naval activities allowed 
the rais (chief or boss) Mesaud ibn Amar, aka “Sibara” (a corrupted form of 
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Civera, the name of a famous Spanish Admiral) and his associate Abdelkrim ben 
el-Hayy Ali Luh to become very powerful men in Ibuqquyen (Pennell 2001). 
On the other hand, the concentration of power in Ibuqquyen took place mainly 
around religious or civil leaders, such as cheikhs, not around military caudillos. 
The roots of this fact rested in the persistence of traditional social structures of 
Riffians in a context of weak articulation of civil administration in Morocco and 
lack of civil influence by European countries. If the internal authority of the 
Sultan and the Makzhan relied on and was mainly exerted through the army, the 
importance of religious and civil leaders in the central Rif could only reflect its 
limits or, to put it in positive terms, Riffian ability of affirming its identity and 
traditions. The fact that local qadis (Islamic judges), such as the father of 
Abdelkrim in Ait Waryaghar, were confirmed in their posts by the Sultans and 
were asked to support them through the bay’a (an oath of allegiance paid by all 
Moroccan authorities and groups to every new Sultan), does not contradict the fact 
that their authority was derived mainly from the dynamics of local society and not 
from the central power. 
Accordingly, health care in Ibuqquyen had mainly a naval and civil orientation. 
On the one hand, the relative weight of “piratical” activities and smuggling, plus 
alternative routes of seasonal migration, kept them quite out of reach of the 
French Algerian and Tangier maritime health services. It could happen that drugs 
or basic medical material were obtained in deals with the Spanish enclaves and 
foreign ships or by pillage, although it has not been possible to confirm this fact. 
On the other hand, traditional practitioners of various sorts and scattered djemas 
(mosques), dar dmanas (houses of religious brotherhoods or tariqas) and shurfa 
(saints) shrines continued to provide for the needs of most local inhabitants. As 
long as significant irregular forces were difficult to organize, military health care 
remained secondary in importance. 
The autonomy of action of Ibuqquyen towards Moroccan authorities was 
matched by similar developments in the Spanish enclaves of the area towards 
peninsular authorities. The Legation of Tangier supported the harkas sent to 
punish qabilians by allowing Moroccan troops to disembark in Melilla or its 
surroundings and then move to the central Rif. However, it was also the peñones 
of Alhucemas and Vélez that needed control, because they acted almost indepen-
dently given their insignificance. Though formally in a state of hostility towards 
coastal qabilas, both peñones were in practice supplied with foodstuffs by them 
and, in turn, allowed the smuggling of Riffians with foreign and Spanish ships 
(and engaged in it) (Villalobos 2004). In this way, they fostered Ibuqquyen auto-
nomy as much as their own, thus hindering Makhzan and Spanish general interests 
at the same time. 
In public health, military hospitals located in Vélez and Alhucemas had a pre-
dominantly civil function. The military garrisons in both enclaves were so reduced 
(one Infantry company in theory) that state functionaries (teacher, telegrapher, 
lighthouse keeper, customs officer), their families and the families of the Army 
officers, plus a tiny Jewish community, accounted for most of the work of the 
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army doctors. The Spanish military hospitals of Alhucemas Vélez also carried out 
a task of “attraction” similar to that in Ceuta and Melilla but with the difference 
that benefits were mainly for civilians and not for Riffian irregular combatants. 
Up until 1909, Lieutenant Dr. Manuel Bastos Ansart observed that the coastal 
qabilas “used to bring us for assistance all ill people who were not cured by the 
potions and magic of their saints” (Bastos 1969). 
Both the Makhzan and the Spanish authorities tried to put an end to this 
situation. In the first case, the maximum degree of control was achieved after the 
1898 harka. The brutality of this expedition reflected the degree of force 
Moroccan authorities had to display in order to exert some control on the area. It 
was also characteristic of the strongly authoritarian character of the Ba Ahmed 
regency in his efforts to keep the country united. The first objectives of the harka 
were to supress naval activities and disorganise civil society because those were 
the key mechanisms for Ibuqquyen autonomy. The two Moroccan gunboats 
supporting the expedition, the Hassani and the Turki, confiscated two carabos 
used by local people. On the other hand, Makhzan troops executed four local 
cheikhs, burnt fields, destroyed houses, imposed heavy fines and took almost 400 
prisoners to Fez (Pennell 2000). In the second place, the brutal use of force was 
intended to integrate incipient military and maritime structures under Makhzan 
authority. For example, Ibuqquyen had managed to organise a force of 500 armed 
men to oppose the harka (Hart 1976) while its “commerce” free from taxes such 
as those imposed in the imperial ports had disliked the Makhzan since the 1840s 
(Pennell 2000). Besides, the Ait Waryaghar had been engaged in a “seven years 
war” during the 1890s, in which fractions of nearby qabilas (Temsamam, Ait 
Ammart, Ait Tuzin and also Ibuqquyen) had also been involved.  
Military and maritime structures had made slow developments in previous years 
as an extension of naval and civil power, but now the goal was to promote them 
under Makhzan control because that would allow connection with the rest of 
Morocco and subordination to central and provincial authorities. The harka 
imposed Makhzan military authority in the area by repressing Ibuqquyen forces 
and integrating combatants from Ait Waryaghar and other qabilas. On the basis of 
military force, a reform of civil structures was made through the appointment of 
new amils or imgharen (local governors of fractions). After the punishment, the 
harka remained camped in the fraction of Izimmuren and its presence discouraged 
naval activities, compelling qabilians to commerce through the customs stations 
of Melilla or Ceuta and to increase seasonal migration to French Algeria and 
Tangier. Through both exceptional methods, the Ibuqquyen (and the central Rif in 
general) seemed to join the general frame of the Moroccan state, but this did not 
last long. The harka retreated one year later to Tafersit in the Eastern Rif and in 
1904 to Taza and Fez. This quick fading of Makhzan authority enabled local auto-
nomy once again, this time led by the Ait Waryaghar, who had traditionally had 
“their backs turned on the sea” (Hart 1976). Military and maritime structures had 
advanced but were now beyond control of the Sultan and the naib. 
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In public health, the army doctors who travelled with the harka, Mahboub and 
Si Ahmed Temsamami, embodied the extension of the activities of the School of 
Tangier to the central Rif. In Ellen Amster’s words, Temsamami used “European 
methods” in a task which comprised assistance to official troops and local contin-
gents. As the harka itself, the presence of military doctors probably did not last 
long. On the other hand, repression in Ibuqquyen provoked part of the local popu-
lation to migrate temporarily or definitively to Tangier, French Algeria and even 
to continental Europe, thus being subjected to health measures of the respective 
maritime authorities. After the retreat of the harka, a number of local inhabitants 
resumed their naval activities and escaped again the control of maritime health. 
In the case of Spain, the strategy consisted of linking the peñones with Melilla 
under a single military command, especially during and after the incidents of 
1893–1894, and of reinforcing the Spanish military institutions and garrisons in 
Vélez and Alhucemas. On this basis, smuggling diminished and the business of 
civilians and Jews with the army increased. In public health, the army doctors had 
to focus more on officers and soldiers. However, the almost incredibly tiny size of 
both enclaves and the impossibility of extending activities to coastal qabilas 
prevented major changes. Assistance to Spanish and Riffian civilians continued to 
be a relevant part of the doctors’ work. 
If there is one thing that should be remembered from this brief presentation of 
the different levels of Moroccan public health is that there existed an articulated 
transition between central institutions and the areas beyond their reach. The 
provincial and local levels of the Moroccan state and public health actually 
existed and should not be relegated into the extremes of makhzan and siba as is 
usually done. Despite autonomous tendencies, these intermediate levels were con-
nected to the general frame of Moroccan public health through more or less autho-
ritarian procedures. Similarly, despite strong European influence, Moroccan 
authorities managed to keep a degree of initiative in public health affairs at all 
levels. As a result, diversification and authoritarian concentration, and the predo-
minance of military and maritime public health were reproduced as general 
characteristics of the Moroccan health system. Only at the level of siba were these 
characteristics reversed, and only there, did a breach with the rest of the country 
occur. A more complex picture arises from this perspective, which helps better 
explain the future difficulties of Spain and France in reorganising public health in 
their Protectorates. 
Tangerian Ghosts and Riffian Realities 
The Limits of Colonial Public Health in Spanish Morocco 
After the signing of the Act of Algeciras (1906), the doors were finally open for 
Spain and France to intervene more directly in Moroccan public health in their 
respective zones of influence. The Protectorate treaties between France and 
Morocco (March 12, 1912) and France and Spain (November 27, 1912) were a 
new step in this direction. As a theoretical result of these agreements, the unified 
Moroccan public health regime should have given way to separate health systems 
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in each zone. The challenge for French and Spanish authorities was not to create 
structures out of nothing, but rather to reform pre-existing levels in each zone. 
Europeans would now lead the process and have the executive power, thus finally 
ending Moroccan initiatives. Territories and population that had been out of reach 
would become integrated. A more balanced development of public health would 
also be encouraged, so that all four branches – maritime, military, naval, land – 
had similar weight. Direction of public health affairs would be more technical, 
based upon the expertise of doctors and upon scientific institutions such as labora-
tories. In theory, the Protectorate regime would allow more Moroccan participa-
tion in the health system than a colonial regime, but ultimately Moroccan institu-
tions and personnel would be subordinated to French and Spanish authorities. 
In practice, neither Algeciras nor the Protectorate treaties ended Moroccan 
agency. Abdallah Laroui has affirmed, against colonialist narratives, that the 
initiatives of the Moroccan state lasted until 1912: only from then on did “initia-
tives” give way to “reactions” (Laroui 1993). This study argues, however, that 
though most fragile and more tenuous than ever, Moroccan initiatives continued 
to exert a persistent influence in the newly established French and Spanish Protec-
torates until the late 1920s. (In fact, one could wonder if initiatives ever dis-
appeared, as the nationalist movement gained momentum already in the early 
1930s.) In Spanish Morocco’s public health, perhaps the clearest proof of this was 
that the maritime and military branches kept on being pre-eminent in the newly 
established health system. This had to do with the fact that the new system con-
tinued to be influenced by the Sanitary Council of Tangier (which was still 
functioning), while a significant part of the territory and population managed to 
stay out of reach. The so-called “Tangier question” and “Rif question” – which I 
have termed the Tangerian ghosts and Riffian realities – were the paradigmatic 
examples of the difficulties created for Spain by the continuity of Moroccan 
agency and institutions during this period. Only by an increasing use of force, 
diplomatic and military, and by an increasing authoritarian concentration of power 
could Spain slowly begin to solve both “questions” and to establish a health 
system in its zone. But in this way, it moved away from the very Protectorate 
regime it sought and was obliged to deploy. 
“Tangerian Ghosts” 
The Persistence of the Sanitary Council of Tangier 
From Consular Doctors to Urban Dispensaries (1906–1912). The Algeciras Con-
ference marked the beginning of a new phase in the “Morocco question” and 
paved the way for the future establishment of Protectorate regimes. In their tacitly 
acknowledged “zones of influence,” France and Spain compromised to support 
the authority of the Sultan and the Makhzan in order that the necessary moderni-
sation of the army, finances, industry, commerce and health system could be 
achieved. In practice, this meant an unprecedented degree of intervention of those 
two countries in Moroccan institutions. However, as Abdallah Laroui has shown, 
the Act of Algeciras was the “last victory” of the Sultan against foreign powers, 
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which would serve as a basis for future moves towards independence in the 1940s 
and 1950s (Laroui 1993). 
One of the main reasons for this was that Tangier remained outside both zones 
of influence. The city stood at the same time as the last site of Moroccan authority 
and as the last site where multiple foreign influences could be overtly exerted. 
Some of the old international and Makhzan institutions remained, while other new 
“international” organisms were planned or created. It was countries such as Great 
Britain and Germany who were especially interested in supporting the autonomy 
of the city and in still recognising some authority to the Sultan. That was a means 
for them to maintain some intervention in Moroccan affairs and to prevent France 
and Spain from exerting exclusive control in their zones of influence. The so-
called “Tangier question” would prove influential in all spheres, including public 
health. 
Health issues were not among those regulated by the Act of Algeciras, which 
limited itself to the following agreements: 1) Creation of a police force in Tangier 
and other ports; 2) Fight against smuggling; 3) Creation of a Moroccan State 
Bank; 4) New taxes and improvement of the financial system; 5) Reform of the 
customs; and 6) Public works and public services. However, this very absence 
implied that an institution so important and with such a long trajectory as the 
Sanitary Council of Tangier remained untouched. In fact, the Council was once 
mentioned in the text, in the fourth chapter, article 61, regarding the question of a 
new tax on urban properties which should be used for public works in the main 
cities: 
A Tanger, cette quotité sera versée au Conseil Sanitaire Internationale, qui en 
réglera l’emploi jusqu’á la création d’une organisation municipale. 
Nothing was said about the Council’s authority in public health, which dated back 
to the times of Sultan Moulay Abdehrraman. Nor was anything said about its 
possible replacement by other equivalent institutions in the French and Spanish 
zones. So the Council was subtly acknowledged, and its functions were neither 
denied nor reshaped. Far from disappearing or being dismantled, it started to 
become a kind of “ghost”, as did the zone of Tangier as a whole, its structures and 
its old regulations of 1840 and 1879 inevitably interfering with the maritime 
health institutions France and Spain planned to create in their respective zones of 
influence. 
In fact, the impact of the “Tangier question” for Spain (and France) was 
multiple. On the one hand, the persistence of the Council meant that Spain could 
not concentrate its efforts exclusively in its zone of influence. Spanish representa-
tives had to be kept in Tangier and in ports of the French zone as part of the old 
system which had not disappeared. In addition, other European countries could 
keep influencing maritime public health in both zones. On the other hand, the 
Tangier Legation kept an important role as co-ordinator of Spanish delegates in 
the ports of the Spanish zone. Its power would interfere with a future maritime 
health authority based in Spanish Morocco. Third, the traditional weight of the 
Larache delegation could transform it in the centre of maritime health in the 
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Spanish zone, but this would probably allow too much Moroccan participation 
because Spanish presence and influence in this city were weak in comparison, for 
example, with Tettouan. Finally, urban public health, of which dispensaries for 
natives were to become a most representative component, was also disrupted 
because the Council had not received authorisation from the Sultan to create 
health institutions in the cities – except for Tangier itself. In this context, it is not 
strange that the control of maritime public health became of extreme importance 
for the development of a health system in Spanish Morocco – at least in the 
Western zone. 
These “shortcomings” of Algeciras’ resolutions implied that maritime public 
health in the Spanish zone did not change much in the years 1906–1912 from 
former decades. Curiously, the most immediate and almost exclusive effect of 
Algeciras was the creation of dispensaries for natives in the Atlantic coast cities. 
They were set up on the basis of the “consular doctors” who had been working in 
Moroccan ports since the 1880s. One of them, Captain Dr. Francisco García 
Belenguer, who worked in Larache, was the first to suggest in June 1906 that a 
dispensary should be built in that city. It was necessary to extend medical services 
to a wider population of “poor Moors and Israelites” so that Spanish influence was 
consolidated and the work of the French doctor recently sent to the city, neutra-
lised. (France would keep a dispensary in Larache and a doctor in Tettouan for 
many years). Following this proposal, the doctor of the Spanish Legation in 
Tangier, Major Dr. Francisco Triviño Valdivia presented to the Ministry of State a 
project for creating dispensaries in the Spanish zone four months later (Proyecto 
de instrucciones para la organización y funcionamiento de los dispensarios 
médicos de España en Marruecos). Two years later, the new doctor in Larache, 
Captain Dr. Carlos Vilaplana González, wrote a new tract entitled Bases para los 
dispensarios de Marruecos. Dispensario de Larache, another attempt at defining 
the characteristics of the dispensaries. 
The centrality of Larache was not only expressed by its leading role in propo-
sing the creation of dispensaries. In 1911, Spain launched a military operation to 
secure that city and Ksar el-Kebir in the face of French moves near the unofficial 
borders of the Spanish zone of influence. After this operation and many delays 
and bureaucratic proceedings, three urban dispensaries were created in the 
Atlantic region. The first was started in Larache in 1908, under the direction of 
Carlos Vilaplana González (1908–1911) and afterwards Ángel Jack Ocampo 
(1911–1919); the second, in Asilah in 1911 with Francisco Moreno Sáenz (1911–
1921); and the third in Ksar el-Kebir in 1912, with Ramiro Torreira Martínez 
(1912–1913) and Manuel Ocaña López (1914–1921). They had nonetheless a 
provisional character, lacking proper equipment, auxiliary personnel and even 
buildings of their own in some cases during the first years. The directors of dis-
pensaries were dependent on the Spanish consuls in those cities and subsequently 
on the Spanish Legation in Tangier. All administrative paperwork, medical re-
gisters and sanitary initiatives had to be submitted to Tangier for knowledge of 
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and eventual approval by the Legation and by the Ministry of State in Madrid. The 
role of the Tangier Legation would persist in the following years. 
In fact, the creation of dispensaries was not so paradoxical because obtaining 
control of the Council delegations was much more difficult than making a slight 
extension of the work of consular doctors. However, the very provisionality of 
dispensaries showed that such control was necessary for obtaining financial re-
sources and improving their facilities and equipment. This was not the only 
problem. As it was said before, Spanish initiatives were not restricted to its zone 
of influence. That is why, for example, Dr. Francisco García Belenguer was sent 
to Fez in 1908, where he stayed at Moulay Abd el-Hafid’s (1908–1912) personal 
service until the Protectorate treaties were signed. His main task was to try and 
influence the Sultan and the Makhzan and to send reports to the Tangier Legation, 
informing about their activities. But it was too late for him to exert an influence 
similar to that of Fernand Linarès at the end of the 19th century. Spain also kept 
consular doctors in Casablanca and Mogador. At least in the first of those cities a 
dispensary was established which was connected to the Tangier Legation. The 
military doctors who served in Casablanca were Antonio Moncada y Álvarez 
(until 1910), Carlos Amor y Rico (1911–1917) and Vicente Vidal Frenero (1921–
1931), while those in Mogador were José Blanco Larruscaín (until 1911), 
Práxedes Llisterri y Ferrer (1912–1913) and Gabino Gil y Sáinz (1914–1915). 
Resources and personnel were used to keep Spanish influence in the whole of 
Morocco until the 1920s with the subsequent dispersion of meagre resources. 
 
The Strategy of the Juntas Locales (1913–1915). The French and Spanish Protec-
torates were finally established in March and November of 1912, respectively, but 
Tangier and its surroundings confirmed their autonomy from both. The city was 
assigned a vaguely international character, which would take almost fifteen years 
to be legally defined. This fact deepened the impact of the “Tangier question” on 
the Spanish Protectorate’s maritime public health. On the one hand, it confirmed 
the persistence of the Sanitary Council, whose existence and jurisdiction were 
once again taken for granted. Spain should then keep its activities in Tangier and 
other ports of Morocco. On the other hand, Spain could not use the Legation of 
Tangier to lead public health in its zone of influence. Tangerian ascendancy in the 
Northern region would have provided a powerful legitimacy, an administrative 
basis and a unity of action for Spanish health activities in its new Protectorate. 
Instead, a new centre had to be “invented” that would not enjoy Tangier’s pedi-
gree and would suffer from interferences of the Legation. Tettouan was officially 
chosen as new centre but Larache possessed similar, if not more favourable, 
conditions for the task. The Council’s delegation in Larache had been traditionally 
more important and, as has been shown, the first dispensaries for natives had been 
established in Larache and nearby cities. Finally, the problems of creating urban 
health institutions and extending their reach into the countryside would remain. 
In these unfavourable circumstances, Spain began to define its Protectorate 
health system. The French-Spanish Treaty of November 1912 lacked any refe-
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rence to public health matters, and it was necessary to wait for a provisional Pro-
tectorate regulation approved by Royal Orders issued in February and April 1913. 
According to these regulations “public health and hygiene” affairs were assigned 
to the Delegation of Native Services (later, Native Affairs), one of the three 
offices of the Spanish Alta Comisaría (High Commission) in Tettouan. In addi-
tion, Juntas locales de Higiene (Local Hygiene Boards), were to be established in 
the main cities. Apart from the regulations, a new urban dispensary was created in 
Tettouan just after the occupation of the city in February 1913 under direction of 
the military doctor Leopoldo Martínez Olmedo (1913–1919). Finally, Dr. García 
Belenguer was appointed as “intimate consultant” of the new Khalifa (higher 
Moroccan representative for the Spanish zone), Moulay el-Mehdi. He was 
supposed to carry out the same tasks as under the Sultan Moulay Abd el-Hafid in 
previous years. 
These initial measures could not hide the persistent debility when faced with the 
Sanitary Council of Tangier, which was explicitly reflected in the specific orders 
given to the Delegation of Native Services in the 1913 provisional regulations. 
According to them, the main task of this organ in health affairs was to strive for 
the “confluence of the Spanish public health action (dispensaries of Larache, Ksar 
el-Kebir, Asilah, Tettouan, Nador and Zoco el Had [the latter being two country-
side dispensaries run by the Army in the Melilla region] with the delegations of 
the Sanitary Council of Tangier, and its expansion in due terms”. Debility was 
quickly given a more proper name. On the occasion of a plague outbreak in the 
Atlantic region in September 1913, a sanitary commission was sent from Spain by 
the Ministry of State, headed by the Spanish Maritime Health Inspector himself, 
Manuel Martín Salazar. Some months before, the ministry had already proposed 
that Martín Salazar should present a design for organising the health services of 
the Protectorate (following a plague outbreak in the Canary Islands). The Proy-
ecto de Organización de los servicios sanitarios de la zona de influence española 
en Marruecos was finished in May and published in November and became the 
first detailed legal text on public health for Spanish Morocco. 
Among other things, the plan proposed the creation of the Hygiene Institute in 
Larache, whose director would become the Protectorate’s Health Inspector. Sub-
ordinated to him, medical officers in Larache, Tettouan, Ksar el-Kebir and Asilah 
would be in charge of the maritime health stations in the ports as well as the urban 
dispensaries. They would also serve as members of the local boards of those cities 
in order to take general hygienic measures. Larache’s Institute would also serve as 
basis for the creation of a Spanish School of Tropical Pathology in Africa. How-
ever, the plan failed because Martín Salazar ignored the implications of the 
Sanitary Council of Tangier. During his stay in Morocco, he finally realised that 
neither Spain nor France could adequately organise their Protectorates’ public 
health  
because they lack the indispensable sanitary autonomy, due to the existence of 
an International Treaty that assigns such a delicate matter in the Moroccan 
Empire to different national representatives, badly suited for this kind of 
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services, prone to disagreements based on interests beyond public hygiene and 
besides often sterilised by the technical incompetence of officials charged with 
a task which is essentially unknown to them. 
Thus, sanitary autonomy was still the real challenge for Spain, even though the 
Protectorate had been already established, and maritime public health was the key 
to this autonomy because the more control exercised in this field, the more the 
development of urban and countryside health services would be possible. As a 
result of the commission, two provisional “sanitary parks” were established in the 
ports of Larache and Asilah, but its work ran parallel to that of the Council 
delegations and they depended directly on the Spanish Maritime Health Inspec-
tion. This measure was clearly insufficient and Martín Salazar asked the Ministry 
of State to reach an agreement with France in order to obtain sanitary autonomy 
and also to press for a reform of the Sanitary Council bureau so that Spain could 
increase its influence in it. More realistically, Martín Salazar also proposed a local 
strategy to start bringing sanitary power into Spanish hands. He stated that 
as long as the Sanitary Council of Tangier does not acknowledge our sanitary 
autonomy in the ports of our domain, it could be demanded from the Consular 
Corps of the different cities that the right to intervene in the sanitary exami-
nation of ships would be delegated to this Spanish doctor [the dispensary 
doctor]. 
In fact, that right was not “demanded” but taken by force. Spanish authorities 
decided to use the newly created Juntas de Servicios Locales (Local Boards) as 
bases for the use of diplomatic force against the Protectorate legal frame. The first 
Juntas had been established in Tettouan, Larache, Ksar el-Kebir and Asilah by a 
dahir of June 10, 1913 (Cordero Torres 1943). Despite their initial financial and 
legal problems, they provided the institutional space for Spanish consuls to act 
apart from other European representatives and from Moroccan authorities. In the 
absence of specific Local Health Boards, they assumed public health compe-
tencies, placing urban dispensaries under their control. More important, they tried 
and pre-empt maritime health competencies from the Council delegations. It was a 
way either to avoid interference from the Council of Tangier, or to increase the 
role of the Delegation of Native Services of Tettouan in front of the Tangier 
Legation and Larache.  
This process took a particular form in each of the three main ports of the 
Spanish zone. The first move was made in the least important, Asilah, during the 
second half of 1913. The Spanish Consul, who acted then as Council delegate, 
appointed the dispensary doctor, Francisco Moreno Sáenz, as his successor. This 
was a challenge to the Council, as it was this organ that still had the power to 
appoint its delegates. This action provoked official protests of the government of 
Austria-Hungary to the Spanish Ambassador in Vienna in May 1914. The argu-
ment was that, although the Council had not been created as a result of an inter-
national convention, it was “an institution acknowledged by many international 
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treaties”, among them in the “article 176 of the International Sanitary Convention 
of Paris, signed by Spain, and the article 61 of the International Act of Algeciras”. 
Spain tried to act more carefully on the next occasion to avoid such diplomatic 
incidents. This time, the objective was Larache, the main port of Spanish 
Morocco. On January 1, 1914, the Spanish Consul José Buigas Dalmau was to 
start his term as Council delegate for the next six months. A doctor from Martín 
Salazar’s commission, Benigno García Castrillo, was still in the city in charge of 
the provisional “sanitary park” that had been installed in the port, and the Council 
health official was a Spaniard named Ildefonso Hernández. Buigas first tried to 
“obtain” the post of delegate from the Belgian consul in December following 
secret instructions from the Ministry of State, but the consul refused to act without 
previous authorisation by the Council. Then, on January 1, Buigas received his 
post and immediately ordered Dr. Castrillo to assume the sanitary inspection of 
ships, while Hernández would become his “substitute”. Buigas planned to keep 
this situation beyond June 30, as he expected no protests during the following 
term of the French consul, because “France seeks for its zone the same indepen-
dence we seek for ours”. These legal subterfuges proved effective: France did not 
protest, Dr. Castrillo inspected the ships, equipment and facilities were improved 
and the money raised through ship inspection was not sent to Tangier. 
Despite all precautions, the economic importance of the port of Larache made 
protests from other countries all the more expected. This time it was Great Britain 
that complained to the Spanish government. On January 1, 1915, the British 
consul in Larache began his term as delegate, and the same day the British consul 
in Tangier became president of the Sanitary Council. Besides, Great Britain had 
not yet officially acknowledged the Spanish Protectorate. To respond to British 
protests, the Ministry of State asked for a copy of the 1840 Council regulations to 
the Tangier Legation, and some time later sent a note to the British Ambassador in 
Madrid with a wide array of arguments defending the Spanish position. For 
example, the Council was not the result of an international agreement; Spain had 
been charged with implementing a public health administration in the name of the 
Makhzan; and a sanitary station had been set up in Larache that provided a 
preventive service that had not existed before. In addition, the 1861 Treaty of 
Commerce with Morocco, still in force, also allowed Spanish consuls to issue 
sanitary certificates for boats on the Rif coast. Finally, the international conven-
tions stated that consuls were not prepared to render adequate health service, 
which should be assigned to trained personnel as Spain had done in Larache. 
The First World War, which had already started, also provided a powerful 
argument. It was necessary to maintain the de facto situation in Larache and 
Asilah in order to ensure the “neutrality” of the ports of Spanish Morocco, 
because a British or French consul “could raise problems with ships of belligerent 
countries”. Sanitary inspection by Spain would be more “objective” because “a 
foreign consul may be a self-interested party in the present European conflict”. 
So, the Ministry of State could affirm that “the war was the cause of Mr. Buigas 
keeping the delegation post”. Finally, in October 1915, the consul in Larache sent 
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a copy to the Ministry of State of the sanitary certificate made by the French 
consul of Kenitra for an English ship. If sanitary inspection in Kenitra was done 
by the French consul and not by the Council delegate, the Spanish initiative in 
Larache seemed not so unjustified. Strictly, both problems were not equivalent 
because the port of Kenitra had had no Council delegate prior to the Protectorate. 
However, the fact that France made moves to control maritime public health in its 
zone supported Spanish demands for its own. 
The problem did not disappear and was brought to the fore every time a new 
foreign diplomat began his term as president of the Sanitary Council. In Novem-
ber 1915, it was the Russian diplomatic agent in Tangier who, as Council 
president, again demanded a solution for the delegation of Larache. He proposed 
that the Spanish consul could “incidentally and given the present circumstances 
keep the post of delegate as long as he sent the money raised by ship inspection 
since mid-1914 to Tangier”. The Ministry of State and the Tangier Legation were 
eager to accept this proposal but only if it was taken as “definitive and not 
provisional”, that is, the Spanish consul in Larache “would always be the Sanitary 
Council delegate” and the doctor of the Junta would be responsible for ship 
inspection. No agreement was reached and the situation remained as before. 
In the view of the Ministry of State, it was only a matter of time before a similar 
problem arose in the third main port of the Spanish zone, Tettouan. Despite being 
the Protectorate’s official capital, in Tettouan’s port, Martil, maritime public 
health still remained in the hands of the Council delegate. On January 1, 1916 the 
French delegate was to surrender the post to the German consul for the next six 
months. But as these two countries were at war, the French consul suggested to 
the Alto Comisario (High Commissioner), General Francisco Gómez Jordana, that 
the Spanish consul became the delegate. Gómez Jordana sent the proposal to the 
Ministry of State, which accepted the idea. However, at the last moment, France 
decided to propose the consul of the Netherlands as the new Council delegate, 
with the subsequent deception and protests of Spanish Protectorate authorities. 
This fact just confirmed Tettouan’s secondary role in relation to Larache be-
tween 1913 and 1915. The lack of centralised control on maritime public health 
was reflected in new plague outbreaks. In addition, Tettouan could not stop the 
activities of the Spanish Legation in Tangier, which carried much of the weight of 
the strategy of the Juntas. Besides, Spanish activities continued in other parts of 
Morocco. Just after the Protectorate was established, a Spanish Laboratory of 
Bacteriology had begun its work in Tangier almost simultaneously and in direct 
competition with the French Pasteur Institute headed by Dr. Paul Remlinger 
(Moulin 1997). The military doctors Celestino Moreno Ochoa (1913–1917) and 
Francisco Mora Caldés (1917–1921) were its first directors. Consular doctors 
continued to be appointed to the Spanish Legation and often served in the Spanish 
Hospital that had been in operation since 1888. In this period, the military doctors 
Federico Baeza and Francisco Triviño were replaced by Enrique Pedraza de 
Vivanco (1914–1918) and Emilio Crespo y García de Tejada (1915–1917). On the 
other hand, Spanish doctors in Casablanca and Mogador continued their task in 
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both cities during these years, though with uncertain purpose, while the southern 
zone of the Spanish Protectorate (Cape Juby/Tarfaya) still awaited effective occu-
pation. 
Despite all problems, the pre-emption of maritime health competencies by the 
Juntas provided the “umbrella” for the start of the later so-called Sanidad Majzén 
(Makhzan public health), that is, the health services created and controlled by 
Spanish authorities but addressed to the Moroccan civil population in the name of 
the Khalifa, in other words, the Protectorate health system as such, directed from 
Tettouan and addressed to Moroccans. The Juntas were able to acquire financial 
resources from ship inspection and from the Ministry of State (since 1915). The 
posts of Officers of Local Health Services or Local Boards Health Officers, that 
is, a kind of municipal health inspectors, were created the same year. The “sani-
tary parks” of Larache and Asilah were officially integrated in the Juntas and the 
first statistics of ship inspection were collected and sent to the High Commission. 
Urban dispensaries were officially recognised as “Makhzan dispensaries” by a 
dahir of January 1, 1915. The number of people (“Moors”, “Israelites” and Spani-
ards or Europeans) treated in these centres grew significantly. But more important, 
public health measures could be planned on a regular basis and a wider scale. For 
example, in October 1915, the High Commission ordered the Officer of Local 
Health Services in Larache to design a form to collect statistical data “for a better 
knowledge of the salubrity of this city”, which was subsequently extended to the 
other main towns. Morbidity and mortality data were then ranked according to a 
standard nosology, and included information on nationality and religion. As a 
result, monthly statistics started to be submitted to the High Commission and 
published in the Boletín Oficial de la Zona de Protectorado de España en Marru-
ecos (BOZPEM), providing a first picture of the Protectorate’s epidemiology. 
Preventive measures such as smallpox vaccination increased. For example, just 
a few weeks after Tettouan was occupied and its dispensary created, the Spanish 
consul in the city asked the Ministry of State to send 800 doses of smallpox 
vaccine “so that the doctor attached to the Consulate may vaccinate for free those 
natives who ask for it”. It was clearly a propagandistic measure, although it was 
justified due to the “appearance” of some cases of smallpox and the “necessity of 
diffusing among the native population the use of vaccination”. In Larache the 
consul Buigas asked in June 1914 that a “depot of sera and vaccines” be installed 
in the city, and that smallpox vaccine be sent. The petition was written, not by 
chance, just a few days before the consul started the procedure to try seize the 
Council delegation post and was justified using the same arguments as in 
Tettouan. Apart from these opportunistic occasions, vaccination was done regu-
larly as public health structures stabilised. For example, a “vaccination service” 
was organised in the dispensary of Larache from June 1915. Its announcement 
stated:  
In the dispensary of Larache, vaccination will be offered for free to all indi-
gents of every nationality, from 10 to 12 in the morning and 2 to 4 in the after-
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noon. Apart from smallpox vaccine, anti-typhoid vaccine and anti-diphtheria 
serum will be provided to the poor, also for free. 
Dispensaries also offered the poor population drugs for free, which were supplied 
by the Military Hygiene Institute in Madrid. Finally, projects for new water 
conducts and sewage collection began to be planned and discussed by the Juntas 
of the main cities. 
 
The Creation of the Health Inspection and the “Denunciation” of the Council of 
Tangier (1916–1918). The 1915 budget of the Ministry of State for Morocco 
included for the first time a sum for a “doctor, General Health Inspector”. Admi-
nistrative documents confirm that both Spanish peninsular and Protectorate 
authorities planned the appointment of a Protectorate Health Inspector during the 
second half of that year. In contrast with former projects for Larache, the new post 
was presumably be given to the director of the Tettouan’s civil infirmary, which 
had been created for the assistance of the Spanish population of the city already in 
1914. In November 1915, a public call was issued by Manuel Martín Salazar and 
some time later Dr. Eduardo Lomo Godoy, director of the civil infirmary of 
Tettouan, was appointed to the post. The selection committee included Jorge 
Francisco Tello, head of the Epidemiology Section of the “Alfonso XIII” Hygiene 
Institute of Madrid who had accompanied Martín Salazar in the 1913 commission; 
the Spanish Representative in the Office International d’Hygiene Publique of 
Paris, Dr. Ángel Pulido, former Spanish General Health Inspector, 1901–1902; 
Dr. Víctor Llorente, a specialist in sera and vaccines who owned an important 
laboratory in Madrid; and the Professor of Parasitology and Tropical Pathology of 
Madrid, Gustavo Pittaluga (Rico Avello 1969). Such an imposing group of hygie-
nists was surely intended to give the candidate the full support of the Spanish 
public health establishment. 
This fact reflected the increased legitimacy and power that Tettouan had gained 
as the public health centre of Spanish Morocco. In fact, the promotion of Tettouan 
was a main objective of the High Commissioner Francisco Gómez Jordana during 
his term from July 1915 until December 1918. Soon after his appointment, the 
first official regulation for the Spanish Protectorate was approved on January 24, 
1916. In public health, this regulation confirmed the creation of a General Health 
Inspection inside the Delegation of Native Affairs, whose main function was to 
act as consultative board for the High Commission in “public health and hygiene 
affairs”. Periodical visits were also to be made to the health services by the in-
spector in order to suggest possible reforms, while a general report had to be sub-
mitted to the High Commission at least every two years. Dependent on the Health 
Inspection, the directors of civil hospitals and infirmaries would become “dele-
gates for the services of health intervention”. 
However, the 1916 regulations had quite a limited effect in creating a technical 
public health authority with actual executive power. The inspection and its dele-
gations remained a consultative body, so final decisions were in the hands of the 
Delegate of Native Affairs and the local consuls-interveners. Dependence on 
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metropolitan public health was still high. To that date, the civil hospitals and 
infirmaries built or planned were still intended exclusively for Spanish citizens, 
leaving dispensaries as the sole Makzhan services. This last fact is very important 
because the Ministry of State would give more and more support to institutions 
exclusively directed to Spaniards, instead of promoting Protectorate centres. The 
risk began of grow of negating Spain’s international compromises towards 
Morocco which would develop in the years to come. 
In these circumstances, new acts of force for acquiring maritime health compe-
tencies were necessary to further strengthen the Health Inspection and Tettouan’s 
central role. The international context would prove decisive for this process. 
Shortly after the 1916 regulations were approved, French authorities in Morocco 
decided to “denounce” the 1840 firman by which the Sanitary Council of Tangier 
had been established. The state of war was crucial in this action against legal 
agreements, which was probably intended to stop German interference in 
Morocco, so strongly felt prior to and during the war period. The decision was 
conveyed to the foreign representatives in Tangier through the delegate of the 
Sultan in that city. The Residence Generale (French High Commission in 
Morocco) had decided to take full control of its zone’s maritime public health, 
which was to be governed through a new legal regulation to be approved after the 
“denunciation” had gone into effect. 
Immediately, the Spanish Legation in Tangier contacted the Ministry of State 
and expressed its dissatisfaction that France had not informed Spanish authorities 
“so that both governments would have simultaneously acted in both zones”. 
However, it was not too late to co-ordinate Spanish initiatives with those of 
French authorities. The “denunciation” of the 1840 firman was a very convenient 
move for Spanish Morocco’s interest in achieving its “sanitary independence”. 
Thus, the Legation began planning a parallel “denunciation” to be published on 
the same date as the French statement which would put an end to the Council’s 
interference in the Spanish zone. Soon afterwards, a regulation “reorganising 
maritime health police” would be approved which would serve as the basis for 
“the future sanitary regulations”. The Legation felt confident of this manoeuvre, 
as no diplomatic protest, especially from Great Britain, had followed the French 
decision. 
The plan was put into action through a Khalifian dahir published in the 
BOZPEM on March 13, 1916 – the same day as the French Sultanian dahir – 
which was to go into effect on March 19. The law established that the pachás of 
the port cities would assume the responsibilities of the Council’s delegates in 
maritime public health, “though they could, nonetheless, delegate this function in 
benefit of the service”. A royal decree from the High Commission March 29, 1916 
put into effect this new delegation of authority from the pachás to the Spanish 
Consul-Interveners. In sum, jurisdiction in sanitary matters had been removed 
from the Council and returned to the Makhzan (reversing the events of 1840), 
which, in turn, had re-delegated the power in this field to the French and Spanish 
Protectorate authorities. 
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However, the effect of these measures was not as decisive as it was planned. 
This was largely due to Great Britain’s will to continue its support of the Council. 
Just a month after the French and Spanish dahirs were published, the British 
ambassador in Madrid, Sir Arthur Hardinge, addressed the Minister of State, the 
Count of Romanones, to convey the opinion of the British government that the 
suppression of the Council would cause serious inconvenience due to the absence 
of a central organ that could co-ordinate quarantine policy and the application of 
sanitary regulations in the Spanish and French zones and Tangier. To avoid this, 
Hardinge proposed the creation of a new “Sanitary Council of Morocco” on the 
basis of articles 27 and 102 of the planned Tangier Statute, which was then being 
negotiated between France, Great Britain and Spain. 
Hardinge reiterated his proposal to the new Minister of State, Amalio Gimeno, 
in August. Some days later, the French ambassador in Spain transmitted the 
complete agreement of its government with the British plan. Caught by surprise, 
the Minister of State requested a report from the chief of the Tangier Legation, F. 
Serrat, who was also surprised because, in his opinion, there was nothing in article 
27 to support the French-British proposal, and he had no knowledge of the 
existence of an article 102. He nonetheless found a clear explanation for the 
“paradoxical fact” of “re-creating a Sanitary Council or restoring the existing with 
its former powers”: it would mean again accepting foreign intervention “after 
having paid with sacrifices for the independence of our action in Morocco”. For 
Great Britain, it was a way to retain its intervention in Moroccan public health, 
while the benefit for France would be that the new Council would favour its 
never-abandoned ambition of controlling the whole of Morocco at the expense of 
the Spanish zone. Serrat thought that Spain should reject this proposal and defend 
its decisions against the two countries. If a co-ordinated action on quarantine or 
any other issue was considered necessary, “it would suffice to follow the corre-
sponding international regulations adopted in the different Sanitary Conventions”. 
Besides, it would be more important for Spain to co-ordinate maritime public 
health in the ports of Spanish Morocco “with regulations in force in the península 
and Spanish African enclaves” than with the rest of Moroccan ports. 
As a result of these diplomatic manoeuvres, maritime public health was still 
unable to achieve sufficient autonomy in Spanish Morocco. The provisional “sani-
tary parks” installed in Larache and Asilah after the end of 1913 had not become 
“sanitary stations”, although such projects were planned since 1915. Conse-
quently, the Sanidad Majzén directed from Tettouan kept its modest development. 
Interference from the Tangier Legation continued. For example, the Spanish 
bacteriological laboratory in that city increased its activities in Spanish Morocco. 
In 1915 its services included diagnosis and assistance in rabies cases from 
Tettouan, Larache, Ksar el-Kebir and Asilah. In 1917, the laboratory asked the 
Institute of Military Hygiene to send antityphoid, anti-paratyphoid, anti-dysenteric 
and haemolytic sera, as well as smallpox vaccine, all for diagnostic purposes. 
Competition with the laboratory of Tangier still came mainly from Larache, not 
from Tettouan. As was mentioned above, in 1914 the Spanish consul Buigas had 
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asked for a “deposit of sera and vaccines” from the Alfonso XIII Hygiene Institute 
to be established in the city and “periodically renewed”. This initiative did not 
succeed, but in 1916 the Commander General of Larache asked the Tangier 
Laboratory to send “anti-rabies marrows” for local treatment of the rising number 
of patients in the area. The director, Dr. Francisco Mora Caldés, refused partly on 
technical grounds and partly because he thought its laboratory was prepared to 
“treat all individuals coming from our zone of influence, either military or 
civilians, who need as the sole requisite their presence in this city during the time 
of the treatment”. It seems clear that the laboratory wanted to keep its prerogatives 
at the expense of Larache. 
 
The Authoritarianism of the High Commissioner (1918–1921). Two years had to 
pass for Tettouan to finally become the centre of Spanish Morocco public health. 
The defeat of Germany in World War I increased freedom of movement for 
France and Spain in Morocco, putting an end to more than a decade of German 
intervention after Algeciras. On September 24, 1918, a dahir was published with 
the heading Dahir organizando el servicio sanitario de la Zona. This dahir stated 
“that the power attached to the Makhzan in sanitary affairs would be permanently 
delegated to the Delegate of Native Affairs of the High Commission of Spain in 
Morocco”. The “denunciation” of 1916 had failed because it had returned the 
jurisdiction of the Council to the hands of the Makhzan, but it had not made a 
distinction between the Sultanian (French) and the Khalifian (Spanish) Makhzan. 
This open flank had been used by the British and French authorities to exert 
claims for intervention in maritime health affairs in Spanish Morocco, as has been 
seen. The new dahir closed this door by making the Delegate of Native Affairs 
and not the Khalifa or its Makhzan the direct recipient of responsibility for mari-
time health issues in the Spanish zone. Thus, further interference was prevented, 
but it was at the cost of a new act of force on the Protectorate legal frame. Now it 
was plainly clear that Spain did not “protect” Moroccan authorities but directly 
assumed their competencies. It was all the more natural that, as a result of this 
decision, Dr. García Belenguer ended his mission as “intimate consultant” near 
the Khalifa. 
The dahir created a Central Board of Health (Junta Central de Sanidad) 
composed of ten members and located in Tettouan. Its president was the Delegate 
of Native Affairs. The other members included a functionary of the General 
Secretary of the High Commission, who was to represent the interests of civil 
authorities; a member of the Military Cabinet of the High Commission, who 
would represent the Army; the “doctor who acts as consultant of the Delegation of 
Native Affairs”, that is, the Health Inspector; the Chief of Military Public Health 
in Tettouan; a doctor, a pharmacist and a veterinary appointed by the High 
Commission; an architect from the Delegation of Public Works (Fomento); and a 
secretary without a vote from the staff of the Delegation of Native Affairs. Sub-
ordinate to this central board, specific Local Health Boards (Juntas locales de 
Sanidad) were created inside the Juntas Locales of Tettouan, Larache, Ksar el-
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Kebir and Asilah. Each of these boards contained 12 members: the pachá, who 
was the president; the local consul-intervener, who was the vice-president; a 
representative of the Army; the director of the civil hospital in Tettouan and 
Larache and of the civil infirmary in Ksar el-Kebir and Asilah; a military doctor; 
the chief of the municipal health services; a pharmacist and a veterinary appointed 
by the Delegation of Native Affairs with approval of the High Commissioner; 
three proprietors (one Spanish, one Muslim, one Jew) appointed in the same way; 
and a secretary from the local intervention office. 
On the other hand, the dahir made reference to new institutions, the so-called 
“mixed infirmaries”. In fact, the civil budget for Spanish Morocco published on 
the January 1, 1918 had included sums for the personnel and expenses of two 
“infirmaries for natives” (exclusively for Moroccans) in Tettouan and Larache and 
two “mixed infirmaries” (for Spaniards and Moroccans) in Asilah and Ksar el-
Kebir. Such infirmaries had already started operation between 1917 and 1918, and 
their personnel included, in the first case, two Spanish doctors, two Spanish auxi-
liaries, two Moroccan nurses (one male, one female), a Moroccan cook and a 
Moroccan porter; and in the second case, a Spanish doctor, two Spanish auxilia-
ries, two Spanish nurses (one male, one female), a Spanish cook and a Moroccan 
porter. The infirmaries were considered a necessary complement to the dispen-
saries for natives, because they offered surgical services and a place for convale-
scence. This service could not be provided by dispensaries and, provisionally, had 
been assigned to military hospitals, as will be shown later. 
Despite all, the situation had not changed so much. If the Health Inspector was 
modestly referred to as the “doctor who acts as consultant of the Delegation of 
Native Affairs”, it was because he lacked executive power as well as the admini-
strative, institutional, financial and technical means to plan and implement a 
public health policy. The Health Boards were to act “only as consultative bodies, 
from which the Delegate and its local representatives [the local consuls-inter-
veners] would seek advice when an epidemic of bubonic plague or any of similar 
danger appears”. In 1921 Spanish Morocco still lacked proper sanitary stations in 
its ports, an Institute of Hygiene and a central depot for medical material. No 
health campaigns against syphilis, malaria, typhus or tuberculosis had been 
launched. The budget for civil public health (for Spaniards and Moroccans) had 
risen to a modest six per cent of the total for the Protectorate (781,000 out of 
13,699,322 pesetas) when the infirmaries were planned in 1915, but in 1918 it was 
reduced to a meagre 2.5 per cent of the global expenses (229,000 out of 
11,956,822 pesetas), almost one third of which was for the personnel’s wages. 
Some of these expenses were for Spanish-only or part-Spanish institutions (two 
civil hospitals, two civil infirmaries, two mixed infirmaries). Two “sanitary 
parks”, four modest urban dispensaries and four small infirmaries, two of them 
“mixed”, were clearly insufficient for Makhzan public health to ensure adequate 
assistance for Spanish Morocco’s urban population, even though this group 
comprised only a 10–15 per cent of the zone’s total. 
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 The space allotted to the Sanidad Majzén was, then, small and clearly insuffi-
cient, a side-effect of persistent “Tangerian ghosts” that refused to disappear. 
Impotence led to further authoritarianism in front of the Khalifian Makhzan, 
which was regarded as the only way of acquiring control over health matters. 
Thus, in the 1918 dahir, the High Commissioner himself was given strong control 
over health affairs, even over the Delegate of Native Affairs. His formal approval 
was required before agreements of the Central Health Board were executed and 
also for the appointment of three out of nine voting members in the central board 
and five out of eleven in the local boards. This authoritarian manoeuvre was 
representative of the period when General Dámaso Berenguer served as High 
Commissioner (1919–1922). Berenguer managed to concentrate civil and military 
power in Spanish Morocco in the face of interference from the peninsula, from the 
Tangier Legation and from Moroccan representatives (Cordero Torres 1943). He 
did so in quite a “personal” way, as all initiatives were taken by him, and he 
appointed men in his confidence to key posts (Nerín 2005). In this way, the 
position of Tettouan was clearly strengthened in relation to Larache and Tangier, 
and it would be more so after the strong military campaign that took place from 
1919 to 1921, which resulted in the complete or partial submission of the qabilas 
of Anghera, Wad Ras, Beni Hosmar, Beni Hassan, Beni Messauar, Jbel Hebib, 
Beni Said, Beni Gorfet, Beni Ider, Beni Arus and the holy city of Chefchauen in 
Ajmás. Most of the new territories under Spain’s control were to be administered 
from Tettouan, while Chefchauen was not organised as a regional centre. 
However, authoritarianism hindered even more the technical authority of the 
Health Inspector. It was usually the High Commissioner himself or his General 
Secretary who addressed the Ministry of State or the Ministry of War to deal with 
public health affairs. Thus, it is not strange that the Health Inspection was tempo-
rarily suppressed in the new Protectorate regulations issued on July 12, 1924. 
Concentration of power in the hands of the High Commissioner had other “colla-
teral” consequences. The growing autonomy of Tettouan towards Spanish penin-
sular institutions meant that the Protectorate’s health system would have to 
finance itself with the specific Protectorate budget, with less and less money being 
received as direct contributions from the Ministries of State and War. If the 
Spanish General Health Inspection and the Public Health Section of the Ministry 
of War could no longer intervene as much in Protectorate affairs, then their 
expenditures to the protectorate would be cut. Instead, both ministries focused 
more and more on purely Spanish interests. 
For example, since 1918 the Military Hygiene Institute of Madrid refused to 
continue providing free drugs and vaccines to the dispensaries and to the Tangier 
Laboratory, thus limiting its services to military hospitals and infirmaries. In 1921 
the Ministry of War decided to carry out a general reorganisation of its services 
and personnel in Spanish Morocco. Reorganisation meant reducing costs and 
relocating staff and institutions to better fit strictly military needs that were deter-
mined by the difficult campaigns underway in the Tettouan and Melilla regions. 
Military doctors serving in Tangier and in some Moroccan cities of the French 
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zone, as well as in the south zone of the Protectorate were an easy target. There 
were three consular doctors in Tangier, Francisco García Belenguer (1918–1921), 
Luis Sampedro Díez (1919–1921) and Carlos Amor y Rico (1918–1921) – the 
latter replaced that very year by Ignacio Fernández de Castro – plus the director of 
the Spanish Laboratory and a military veterinarian, Tomás García Cuenca. In 
addition there was the Casablanca dispensary and a consular doctor in Rabat, 
Carlos Amor y Rico (1921–1931), who had been appointed that year. Finally, the 
military doctor Salvador Sanz Perea worked for the Delegation of the High 
Commission in Cape Juby since the occupation of this area in 1916. The budgets 
for all these doctors were terminated. Besides, the countryside dispensary of 
Laucién, near Tettouan, was moved to Chefchauen in 1921, so that medical 
assistance was provided to the forces which had recently occupied the city. 
On the other hand, the Ministry of State focused more and more on health 
services directed to Spanish citizens only. Thus, the Ministry kept on financing 
the civil hospitals and infirmaries established in Tettouan and Larache but made 
no attempt to increase its contribution to mixed infirmaries and infirmaries for 
natives, nor to urban dispensaries. The number of these centres did not grow from 
1918 on and plans for transforming infirmaries for natives into hospitals, as well 
as for creating a new mixed infirmary in Chefchauen were not brought to fruition. 
The Ministry also refused any further effort to establish definitive maritime health 
stations in the ports. Yet, it assumed responsibility for the wages of the doctors 
and veterinarians serving in Tangier, Casablanca, Mogador and Cape Juby, so that 
Spanish presence in the whole of Morocco was not abandoned. In short, the 
growing autonomy of Spanish Morocco’s health system and the financial short-
ages in the peninsula resulted in both ministries concentrating as much as possible 
on their particular (Spanish) interests in Morocco, limiting support given to insti-
tutions directed to Moroccans. It could not have been a worse moment, because 
Spain was occupying more and more territory, which called for a wider health 
organisation. 
As a brief resume, maritime public health continued to be as important in 
Spanish Morocco as it had been before for Moroccan authorities. This fact 
revealed the persistence of external influences, namely the Sanitary Council of 
Tangier, which made it difficult to develop the Sanidad Majzén, which was 
reduced to two “sanitary parks” and a small number of urban dispensaries and 
infirmaries. Efforts of Spanish authorities to reverse this situation led to a growing 
authoritarianism towards the Mazkhzan and the Health Inspection alike and to 
diplomatic acts of force contrary to international agreements. Finally, the High 
Commission had to maximise its resources due to the decreasing or stagnating 
financial contribution from the Ministries of State and War, with the result of no 
more centres being created between 1918 and 1921 and preferential attention for 
Spanish citizens. In short, Spanish Morocco “sanitary autonomy” was only 
achieved by progressively moving away from the Protectorate’s legal frame. This 
was not so paradoxical as it may seem: it just revealed that the degree of effort 
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needed to establish a health system in Morocco, was much more than a “typical” 
colony or even a Protectorate would have called for.  
“Riffian Realities” 
The Opposition to Spanish Presence in the Rif 
The network of dispensaries for natives set up in Spanish Morocco comprised not 
only those in the cities, but also the ones created in the countryside. These dispen-
saries had to face equally strong problems as their urban counterparts during the 
period 1906–1921, although the challenges were of a different kind. They were 
the result of persistent armed opposition of some qabilas to Spanish military 
activities in the name of the Sultan and ultimately of a rejection of the Sultan’s 
authority. The result was that military public health was soon regarded as crucial 
for using the new health system to control maritime jurisdictions. If interference 
from the Sanitary Council of Tangier was especially felt in the Atlantic region of 
Spanish Morocco, local armed opposition would become especially prominent in 
the Melilla region – though not exclusively. 
 
Military Reform and the Fight against Smuggling. The “Rif Question”. The Act of 
Algeciras had agreed to the creation of a “police force” in the eight main ports (or 
“imperial ports”) of Morocco (Tangier, Tettouan, Larache, Rabat, Casablanca, 
Mogador, Safi and Agadir). This “Shariffian Police” would remain under the 
formal authority of the Sultan, and would be composed of Moroccan soldiers and 
European officers and sub-officers and it would be coordinated from Tangier by a 
Swiss chief. In Tettouan and Larache, the officers would be Spanish, in Tangier 
and Casablanca, they would be Spanish and French, and in the rest of the ports, 
they would be French. The new force would comprise between 2,000 and 2,500 
men, many of whom would come from former askar units serving in those cities, 
which had been trained by foreign instructors in previous decades. It was a new 
step in the reform of the Moroccan army, though at the cost of a higher degree of 
intervention by European countries. 
However, Moroccan initiative had been preserved to a certain extent. A military 
“Tangier question” had been created, which would cause serious trouble for 
Spanish military activities in Western Morocco, including public health. On the 
one hand, the formal persistence of Morocco’s military structures implied a dis-
persion of efforts for Spain, as it was obliged to contribute to “Police forces” in 
Tangier and other ports which would probably be outside its zone of influence. 
Army officers were sent to their assigned ports and, in 1907, some Spanish army 
units accompanied French troops when they occupied Casablanca. On the other 
hand, the Legation of Tangier kept its role of co-ordination of army officers and 
personnel appointed to the Spanish consulates, even if the foreseen autonomy of 
Tangier would separate it from the Spanish zone of influence. This fact would 
hinder the autonomy of Ceuta military authorities or of the new military command 
Spain planned to set up in its zone. Third, the traditional weight of Larache (and 
of the Atlantic zone, in general) remained. Such a development could determine a 
central role of this city in the future military command of Spanish Morocco, 
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although this implied less control by Spanish authorities than the equivalent 
influence of Ceuta would ensure in Tettouan. Finally, the measures agreed in 
Algeciras concerned only military structures and this prevented Spain (and 
France) from deploying civil initiatives towards the population of the cities or the 
countryside. In short, developments in the Western region of the Spanish zone of 
influence continued to be strongly conditioned by the formal persistence of the 
Sultan’s military sovereignty. 
In principle, the reform of the Moroccan army agreed to in Algeciras did not 
reach the Eastern part of the Spanish zone, in general Eastern Morocco. It seems, 
however, that a unit of “Shariffian Police” was also created in Melilla, an excep-
tional case given that the rest of units were located in Moroccan towns. Besides, 
the military Governor of Melilla acted as a de facto consul in relationships with 
the Makhzan, as had been done for decades. A special “delegate of the Sultan” 
was projected in the failed Spanish-Moroccan Treaty of 1910 and, in fact, a 
Moroccan official named el-Bachir acted as such during the military campaign of 
1911 to try and dissuade Riffians of attacking Spanish troops (Mesa et al. 2001). 
However, these measures were essentially taken as a result of more or less official 
agreements between Spain and Morocco and, therefore, were outside the new 
international legal frame. Instead, Algeciras had formulated a specific objective 
for the Rif and Eastern Morocco: the fight against gun smuggling. One of the six 
sections of the legal text was exclusively devoted to that issue, which comprised a 
wide array of dispositions, measures and punishments. Special attention was given 
to maritime smuggling, probably due to its importance since the end of the 19th 
century. According to the Act, “l’application du Règlement sur la contrebande des 
armes dans le Riff et, en général, dans les régions frontières des possessions 
Espagnoles, restera l’affaire exclusive de l’Espagne et du Maroc”. The same was 
said for the regions close to French Algeria, where French and Moroccan autho-
rities would have the exclusive responsibility of preventing the gun traffic. 
It could be said that this distinction between military measures in the West and 
the East of Morocco showed the increasing debility of the country in the face of 
foreign intervention. In a way, Morocco was not only being divided in two main 
zones of influence, Spanish in the extreme North and French in the centre, but in 
each of them a longitudinal separation was being drawn. However, this measure 
also threatened to make difficult the creation of a unified military authority in 
Spanish Morocco and French Morocco, given the consequent separation and 
diversity of methods between Spanish and French authorities in Tangier, on the 
one hand, and in Melilla and the South Oranais, on the other. In spite of it all, the 
use of the term “gun smuggling” was an attempt to keep to some extent a link 
between the situation and institutions in both longitudinal extremes of the country. 
For Morocco, it was the way of preserving its military sovereignty, as the fight 
against the gun traffic could be considered a measure complementing army 
reforms, and the authority of the Sultan was not questioned. For Spain and France, 
it was the way of avoiding a lack of coordination of efforts in Morocco and also of 
ensuring that their action reached the whole territory of their zones of influence. 
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In the end, all actors involved in Algeciras and all measures agreed to the act 
attempted to deny the fact that some groups and territories in Morocco were in a 
process of self-determination towards the Sultan and had the ability to oppose 
serious armed resistance to him or to any of his “protectors”. In Eastern Morocco, 
the acquiescence of the Sultan to foreign interference was regarded as demonstra-
ting the demise of his functions. Besides, the exclusion of Tangier from the two 
zones of influence helped finally undermine the legitimacy and reach that 
Moroccan regional authorities had managed to display with great difficulties in 
previous decades. The autonomy of Tangier, that “last victory” of the Sultan in 
Algeciras, would be inseparable from his “first defeat”, the move to independence 
of some areas of the country. The “Tangier question” would be inseparable of the 
“Rif question”. However, Algeciras also attempted denying the particularities of 
Spanish (and French) presence in Eastern Morocco. As it is been shown, Melilla 
had the ability to launch its own initiatives, different from those favored by 
Spanish authorities in Ceuta and Tangier. Besides, as this city would probably be 
outside the Spanish zone of influence, it felt even less obliged to subordinate its 
actions to the new military centres that had been projected in Western Morocco. 
The “Rif question” had a Spanish side, much the same as the “Tangier question”. 
In these circumstances, and despite the “smuggling” rhetoric, the situation in 
the Eastern part of the Spanish zone of influence tended to define itself increa-
singly in its own terms. The link with the Atlantic region was weak. On the 
Moroccan side, the Sultan’s military authority had virtually vanished in the area. 
Since 1904, the false pretender to the throne and supposed Mahdi (a millennial 
figure frequent in movements of resistance in North Africa) el-Roghi Bu Hamara 
had ousted the Makhzan garrison in Silwan and installed himself as actual 
authority in Guelaia (Pennell 2000). It was said before that the harka sent against 
the Ibuqquyen in 1898 had quickly abandoned the central Rif, leaving that area 
beyond the reach of Makhzan forces. However, given that Moroccan military 
integrity had been confirmed in Algeciras, el-Roghi lacked any official recog-
nition despite his actual power in the Eastern Rif. If he could not promote himself 
as a valid representative of the Sultan in front of Spanish authorities, as long as 
the Sultan did not grant him a specific status inside Morocco, the only solution 
was to move away from his authority. In the case of the central Rif, social frag-
mentation avoided any collective leadership, but anyway, existing leaders neither 
had the authorisation to act in the name of the Sultan, nor wanted to obtain it. 
On the Spanish side, Melilla, the Chafarinas Islands and the peñones of Vélez 
and Alhucemas had “smuggling” as one of their relevant occupations, another 
sign of their traditional marginalisation from Spanish action in Morocco. Guns 
coming from Gibraltar and from French Algerian and Andalusian ports were 
transmitted by the enclaves to qabilians, or at least they allowed the traffic. But 
beyond that, “smuggling” was just another aspect of the close relationship of 
Melilla and the enclaves with their surroundings. In some repects, it was difficult 
to say that they were strictly “Spanish”. As it was shown before, the enclave was 
regularly used by Makzhan harkas in their way from Tangier to the central Rif 
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during the last quarter of the 19th century. A unit of “Shariffian Police” had been 
created there. The campo was a zone of transition where Riffians entered to sell 
their products in the market and buy other merchandise. The port of Melilla was 
increasingly used for seasonal migration of Riffians to French Algeria. It was in 
this city that the first military unit composed of Riffian soldiers (the Compañía de 
Moros Tiradores del Rif) had been created in 1859 (Arqués & Gibert 1992). 
Qabilians travelled to the peñones to supply them with foodstuffs and buy 
products. Besides, Spanish official institutions were almost absent. Melilla, and 
even more Chafarinas, Vélez and Alhucemas, were not proper “cities”, as they 
lacked town councilsor other municipal services. While in Ceuta a Commandant 
Generalship existed since the last quarter of the 19th century, a Governorship was 
the only military command in Melilla, which also comprised Chafarinas and the 
peñones. As a consequence of this situation, a tendency persisted in Melilla to act 
apart from Spanish authorities in Tangier and Ceuta, which would prove difficult 
to suppress. 
The interference of Algeciras smuggling regulations would not only be the 
cause of a division between Tettouan and Melilla, but also of a very complicated 
articulation of Spanish military action in the Rif. In some way, the problems were 
parallel to those created by the autonomy of Tangier in the Atlantic region. On the 
one hand, Spain had to spend some of its modest resources in reinforcing the 
Spanish character of Melilla and the other enclaves. A part of the human and 
material means invested by the army in those places was therefore directed to 
themselves and not to activities in Morocco. It could be said that the enclaves 
were being somewhat “re-occupied” even if they were formally Spanish posses-
sions. On the other hand, if a new military administration was finally established 
by Spain in Moroccan territory, it would suffer interference from Melilla and the 
other enclaves. Their traditional military structures, which had dealt with the 
Makhzan and the Riffians until then, would persist, though they would now be 
separated from the zone of influence. Third, the traditional weight of Silwan in the 
region made that town a candidate for becoming the centre of the new military 
administration, but the cost would be a higher degree of local participation than 
Melilla was willing to accept. Finally, military activities could not be a pretext for 
initiatives towards civilians, as there had been no agreement on the issue in 
Algeciras. 
 
From Military Hospitals to Countryside Dispensaries (1906–1912). All these 
events were reflected in military public health. If maritime health was the key for 
Spanish action in Morocco in the Atlantic region, its military counterpart would 
have the leading role in the Rif. However, the Algeciras regulations prevented 
major changes in the period 1906–1912. Substantial efforts were devoted, in the 
first place, to existing military hospitals in Melilla, the Chafarinas Islands and the 
peñones of Vélez and Alhucemas. For example, following the first military 
operations, the Ministry of War decided to raise the category of the hospital of 
Melilla (known as Hospital Central), which became “first class” in March 1908. It 
 223 
was consequently given more personnel and equipment to be able to cope with the 
rising needs of new troops and foreseen operations. During the 1909 and 1911 
campaigns, Melilla counted on two groups of military hospitals and several 
infirmaries, though most centres were provisional (army barracks, schools, 
theatres, churches). The Central Office of Military Public Health of the military 
Governorship of Melilla was transformed by an inspection inside the new Captain 
Generalship created the 1st of June, 1910. Evacuation of wounded and ill was done 
to the military hospitals of Chafarinas and Málaga. A deposit of medical material, 
a laboratory and a radiological cabinet were provisionally installed (Lapresa 
1910). Despite all this, infrastructures and personnel were clearly insufficient for 
assisting a garrison where the numbers had risen to more than 20,000 men (Mesa 
et al. 2001). 
The concentration of efforts on the military institutions of the Spanish enclaves 
left few resources for actions aimed at Riffians. Besides, they continued to be 
managed from the enclaves themselves to a great extent, even if the enclaves 
would probably be outside the future Spanish Morocco. Military hospitals in 
Melilla, Chafarinas and the peñones carried on with their task of “attraction” as 
they had been doing since the last quarter of the 19th century and even increased it. 
For example, Vélez and Alhucemas demanded more facilities and means in order 
to extend Spanish influence in the coastal qabilas. In 1910 or 1911, the military 
doctor appointed to Alhucemas, Manuel Bastos Ansart, argued in a report 
addressed to the Section of Military Public Health of the Ministry of War that the 
assistance of natives was in fact the main task of the hospital, as the garrison was 
very small. Thus, he asked for new clinical and surgical equipment, which was 
immediately sent from Spain (Bastos 1969). It seems that the new material was 
installed in a part of the military hospital, because a separate and permanent 
dispensary for natives was demanded in 1914. However, assistance could be pro-
vided for a growing number of Riffians. 
A new health institution for Riffians was created in Melilla. Just after the 
Algeciras Act was signed, the Spanish Ministry of Public Works launched a plan 
to build a series of civilian infrastructures in Ceuta, Melilla and the Chafarinas 
Islands which would foster Spanish influence in its Moroccan zone. In Melilla, the 
trust of the Marquis of Comillas, one of the biggest Spanish capitalists, won the 
contract to build the port, as well as “a market with fondak [hostel] and cattle 
lodges, an store for grain and merchandise and an infirmary for natives” (Rodrigo 
2002). Such an infirmary or hospital, the later-called Hospital indígena, began to 
be built in 1907 and was finished in 1909. Although it enjoyed civil status, its 
personnel consisted of military doctors and auxiliaries. It did not take long for it to 
be fully integrated in military public health. Its task was to assist Riffian soldiers, 
even though, during the campaigns, it served also as military infirmary for 
Spanish troops. 
But the most important development in the enclaves was the creation of a 
Native Affairs administration of the army in Melilla. This was a consequence of 
the first direct operations of the Spanish army in Moroccan territory, launched in 
224 
January 1908. The justification of the military Governor General José Marina for 
these operations was the defeat of a mhalla sent by Sultan Moulay Abd el-Aziz 
against el-Roghi, which implied Morocco’s inability of ensuring its compromise 
of direct control in the area. Spain would then assume the responsibility of 
preventing “gun smuggling” carried out by el-Roghi in Restinga (a site some 20 
km from Melilla) and, in general, of ensuring the Sultan’s authority in the Eastern 
Rif. A small fraction of Moroccan territory was occupied, where two military 
posts were established at Restinga and Cabo de Agua (in front of the Chafarinas 
Islands). The garrisons included a military doctor who, apart from assisting 
Spanish troops, started to offer his services to qabilians. As they lacked specific 
facilities and remained directly attached to Melilla’s military health organisation, 
their task was a slightly more permanent version of previous (and scarce) travels 
of military hospitals doctors to assist local notables (Larra 1900). 
The direct presence of Spanish troops outside Melilla altered the fragile balance 
of the area. El-Roghi tried to strengthen his position by expanding into the central 
Rif, but he was defeated. In December 1908, he was ousted from his headquarters 
in Silwan by the Guelaians and replaced by two new local leaders, Mohammed 
Amezzian and Chadly, his former lieutenant (Villalobos 2004). Following some 
incidents with Spanish workers in the mines of Ait Bu-Ifrur in the summer of 
1909, the Spanish Army engaged in fighting against Amezzian and Chadly’s 
harkas which resulted in the “Desastre del Barranco del Lobo” (July 27, 1909), 
where more than 150 Spanish officers and soldiers were killed and 900 wounded. 
More troops had to be sent from Spain (a fact that had already caused serious 
revolts in Barcelona and other cities in July), and, with their support, the 1909 
campaign finally ended with the complete or partial occupation of the qabilas of 
Beni Sicar, Mazuza, Ait Bu Ifrur, Kebdana, Ulad-Settut and Ait Bu-Yahi. Later 
on, in 1911, new operations were initiated which resulted in the death of 
Amezzian. The Kert campaign ended in 1912 with the new boundaries for the 
occupied territory reaching the right bank of the River Kert and the inclusion of 
two more qabilas, Ait Sidel and Ait Bu-Gafar, under Spanish rule. 
Just before the 1909 campaign, an Office for Native Affairs was created inside 
the military command of Melilla, with a subordinated information office in Cabo 
de Agua. The task of this office was to gather all kinds of information about the 
occupied territory and the nearby qabilas to ensure both control and future 
advances. It was the direct precedent of the so-called Oficinas de intervención or 
Intervenciones militares (the equivalent of the Services de renseignement de 
l’Armée in French Morocco). In close physical and administrative connection with 
these offices, the first units of the so-called Policía indígena (Native Police) were 
established just after the campaign in the qabilas of Guelaia and Kebdana. The 
Native Police consisted of Spanish officers and Riffian soldiers and combined the 
control of public order with the support to Spanish army units. Finally, Melilla 
authorities were “allowed to attach to the offices anyone who, as garrison doctors, 
may be necessary for the assistance of the Moors”. This statement was the origin 
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of dispensaries for natives in the Eastern Rif area, which acted as the third element 
of the military Native Affairs administration set up in the Melilla region. 
At the end of 1909, the first countryside dispensary was established in Zoco el-
Had of the qabila of Beni Sicar under the direction of Lieutenant Dr. Sebastián 
Lazo García (1909–1914), later followed by Ángel Sánchez Sánchez (1914–
1916), Alberto Conradí Rodríguez (1916–1918), Francisco Camacho Cánovas 
(1919–1920), Manuel Peris Torres (1921–1922) and Tomás de Fez Sánchez 
(1923–1924). It was still provisional by nature, a small wooden barrack with 
modest equipment, some drugs and ointments and no vaccines or sera. In July 
1910, a part of the military infirmary built in the village of Nador (Mazuza) also 
started to serve as a provisional dispensary under the direction of Lieutenant Dr. 
José Valdés Lambea (1910–1915) and later of Nemesio Díaz Mena (1916–1918) 
and Octavio Gómez Salas (1919–1921). After these first steps, a project was 
drafted the same year for establishing four permanent dispensaries in Zoco el-
Had, Nador, Atlaten (Ait Sidel) and Zoco el-Arbaa of Arkeman (Kebdana). A 
Royal Order of March 6, 1911 finally approved their creation and specific status, 
which was different in principle from military infirmaries and garrison service. 
Approval was also given some time later for another centre in Zoco el Tlatza of 
Ain Ben Rahal, close to Silwan (Ait Bu Ifrur). However, only those of Zoco el-
Had and Nador were actually built before the Protectorate Treaty. In Atlaten and 
Zoco el-Arbaa, as in Restinga, Cabo de Agua and other posts, military doctors 
continued their work as before. 
By then, dispensaries had become part of a more complex organisation of inter-
vención militar, headed by the newly created Sub-inspection of Native Troops and 
Affairs of the Captain Generalship of Melilla (5th January, 1912), which already 
counted on several information offices, units of Native Police and groups of 
Fuerzas Regulares Indígenas (new colonial units created on the 30th June, 1911), 
as well as on the aforementioned dispensaries and doctors. It should be borne in 
mind that, despite the term “countryside”, dispensaries were mainly directed to the 
assistance of Riffian soldiers of the two newly created corps (especially of the 
Native Police, because the groups of Regulares had their own attached doctors). 
Maybe for this reason they were assigned a different name in Spanish (consul-
torios) than the urban dispensaries of the Atlantic cities (dispensarios), a name 
already in use in Spanish military public health. In principle, Spain could not 
extend the service towards the local population because its action in the Rif had a 
purely military justification. However, dispensaries assisted civilians from the first 
moment, as the mission of “attraction” or “civilisation” was regarded as crucial. 
But it is also true that in the first years, many of them were the families and rela-
tives of Riffian soldiers. This was not new for the Spanish army, given that in the 
peninsula the families and relatives of officers were assisted for free in military 
hospitals and had access to free drugs in military pharmacies (Martínez Antonio 
2005a). If it is also considered that countryside dispensaries assisted Spanish 
soldiers, it is clear that the task of these centres, despite its importance, was too 
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huge to be achieved satisfactorily (Riffian soldiers + Riffian civilians + Spanish 
soldiers). 
Apparently, the Native Affairs administration of the army had a colonial flavour 
similar to the famous “oil stain” strategy deployed by General Lyautey from the 
South Oranais (Hoisington 1995). However, it was not strictly colonial because it 
depended on the direct military expansion of the Spanish regular army. It is true 
that, due to Algeciras compromises, military actions in the Eastern Rif had to be 
justified in terms of “police operations” and “restoration” of the Sultan’s autho-
rity. That is why the army presence had to be organised on the basis of military 
posts and systematic disarmament of the population could not be achieved. In 
principle, attacks were only launched in “response” to aggression and advances 
after a qabila had asked for “protection”. Despite everything, the 1909 and Kert 
campaigns mobilised thousands of men and caused hundreds of casualties on both 
sides. Those campaigns were mainly carried out by the mobilisation of peninsular 
contingents, despite the creation of the first units of Native Police and Regulares. 
The Spanish army had crossed the limits of Melilla and established a permanent 
presence in some qabilas. In short, only through the direct use of military force, 
through the “seizure” or “expropriation” of Morocco’s military sovereignty, could 
the first intervenciones militares be created. Collaboration of minor local leaders 
was then achieved through them, and Riffians began to be enrolled in the Native 
Police and Regulares or to participate in irregular harkas in support of Spanish 
units. In public health, the first dispensaries started their work, but they depended 
more on the Inspection of Military Public Health of the Captain Generalship than 
on the Sub-inspection of Native Troops and Affairs, which lacked a specific 
health section. Dispensary doctors lacked any specific status within the Army 
Medical Corps and they were often appointed to army units when necessary. 
Many of their patients were Spanish soldiers and, of course, the officers of inter-
vención. The whole “colonial” system depended, then, on the Spanish regular 
army. 
This was not exceptional. Spain was just following the example of France, 
whose advances from French Algeria progressed so quickly that they risked pro-
voking the loss of the Eastern part of the Spanish zone of influence in Morocco. 
Since 1903, General Lyautey had relentlessly moved into Moroccan territory from 
the South Oranais. In 1907, the city of Oujda was occupied by French Algerian 
troops and, soon afterwards, the qabila of Beni Snassen was brought under 
control. The French had contacted el-Roghi for mining concessions and even sent 
a force against him which crossed the river Muluya but was defeated. In public 
health, Lyautey had begun to use military doctors to provide assistance to the 
colonial forces and local population, a crucial feature of his “oil stain” strategy. In 
1910, the Service de Santé des confines Algero-Marocaines was created, which 
threatened to extend its influence to the left bank of the river Muluya (Cilleuls 
1959). In practice, the South Oranais and Melilla were involved in similar prob-
lems and similar strategies and competed in the same area. 
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On the other hand, as it was said before, the Native Affairs administration of the 
army was directed from Melilla and was integrated in its military structures, 
though the enclave itself would probably remain outside the Spanish zone of 
influence. A new military centre in Moroccan territory would then suffer interfer-
ence from Melilla and would also have to compete with Silwan, the traditional 
Makhzan military post in the area. Silwan enjoyed traditional legitimacy in 
Eastern Morocco and it is not strange that el-Roghi established his headquarters 
there. However, if Silwan became the Spanish military centre in the Rif, that 
would mean allowing more Riffian participation than Melilla was eager to accept. 
A first example of this was provided soon after Algeciras. In 1906, the Sindicato 
Español de Minas del Rif (SEMR) – a company where the Marquis of Comillas 
and another powerful businessman and politician, the Count of Romanones, 
participated – was given permission by el-Roghi to exploit iron ore in Uixan in the 
qabila of Ait Bu-Ifrur. A Spanish civil doctor, Víctor Ruiz Albéniz, was hired by 
the company to care for Moroccan and Spanish workers, but he was also un-
officially charged by Melilla military authorities to act as an agent near the 
pretender. Ruiz Albéniz managed to become el-Roghi’s “personal doctor” and, as 
such, he lived “under his protection” for ten months in Moroccan territory (Ruiz 
Albéniz 1922). It is not unlikely that he was also charged with the assistance of el-
Roghi’s harka, the most powerful in the area. As this irregular unit protected 
Spanish interests, it acted as a de facto colonial force in which Ruiz Albéniz could 
have worked as a kind of medical chief. However, the wish for more control of 
Melilla and the fear of international and Moroccan protests (el-Roghi lacked any 
official status) meant that Spain did not support el-Roghi’s expedition to the 
qabila Ait Waryaghar in September 1908, which ended in an astounding defeat. 
Ruiz Albéniz complained that he had not been allowed to “go through Restinga 
and cure the [soldiers of el-Roghi] wounded gathered in the alcazaba [el Roghi’s 
headquarters in Silwan]” (Ruiz Albéniz 1922). The retreat of el-Roghi from 
Guelaia put an end to this moves. 
Spanish troops occupied Silwan in September 1909. A strong military garrison 
was established and a military infirmary was created. But there was no collabo-
ration with Riffian leaders and, therefore, the new Spanish Silwan had no legiti-
macy among the local population. El-Roghi had been supported by Guelaians 
because he had assumed their interests. When Spain could not count on them, they 
were strong enough to oppose the Spanish army through the new leaders 
Amezzian and Chadly and through popular resistance. For complex reasons, 
namely the debility of Spain in regard to international agreements and its lack of 
control on Melilla, collaboration with Riffians was discarded, but “Riffian 
realities” refused to be denied and would cause serious problems in the following 
years. In this context, the town of Nador could only have little authority as 
embryonic centre of the newly occupied territories. The triangular relationship 
Tangier-Tettouan-Larache in the Atlantic zone had a close parallel in the Eastern 
Rif: Melilla-Nador-Silwan. Nador had previously had little or no importance in 
the Eastern Rif and in fact the town was almost made out of nothing, a kind of 
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colonial village if the presence of the army had not been so explicit. Trapped 
between the Native Affairs administration of Melilla and the regular army in 
Silwan and advanced posts, its theoretical role as regional centre during this 
period – and for many years – would be more virtual than real. In addition, Nador 
was theoretically dependant on Spanish authorities in the West, another fact which 
would deprive it of legitimacy when faced with Riffians and also with the Spanish 
army in the Melilla region. 
To end this section, it should be added that this pseudo-colonial system also 
made possible the beginning of civil institutions. The first so-called Juntas de 
Arbitrios were created in the villages of Nador and Cabo de Agua in 1912. The 
Juntas de Arbitrios followed the model of the ones already existing in Melilla, 
Chafarinas and the peñones. They were a kind of municipal council of a lesser 
category than those of the peninsular municipalities and Ceuta, though they also 
depended on the Ministry of Interior (Cordero Torres 1943). As stated before, 
Melilla was not a proper “city” and therefore lacked a town council and a public 
health board, nothing strange in an enclave that had acted for centuries as a mere 
garrison-prison and lacked a significant number of civilians until after the 
Spanish-Moroccan War of 1859–1860. In fact, the Junta of Melilla was controlled 
by the army and presided over by a general, so it tended to confuse itself with the 
military administration. Its public health activities were extremely modest. A so-
called sub-delegate of medicine worked at its service, but civilians were assisted 
either in the military Hospital Central or by private practitioners. If the Junta 
proposed any sanitary measures, it was the army which was usually most affected 
by them and which would put them to work. 
The modest civil public health suffered problems parallel to those of the army. 
First, most of the scarce civil resources invested in the area aimed mostly at 
creating institutions in Melilla and the enclaves which had not existed previously. 
The main interest was to improve the situation of the Spaniards themselves, more 
than to act on behalf of the Riffians. Second, the Junta of Melilla kept on con-
trolling measures towards civilians in the Rif, although the enclave would remain 
outside the Spanish zone of influence. For example, the Hospital Central conti-
nued to assist Riffians as it had done before. As early as 1910 two separate ten-
bed wards for “moros y moras” (male and female Moors) were created. The hos-
pital personnel included two Moroccan male nurses, who acted at the same time 
as interpreters, and a Moroccan cook, who prepared food according to medical 
instructions but adapted it “to the taste of natives”. On the other hand, the creation 
of the new Juntas of Nador and Cabo de Agua made it difficult to establish inter-
venciones civiles (the equivalent of the controleurs civiles in French Morocco) in 
those villages. Their connection with Melilla hindered the central role of Nador in 
the area. As a result, their activities were mainly directed towards Spanish settlers. 
For example, in 1910, the director of the military infirmary of Nador asked 
Melilla if civilians could be assisted in that centre. He received a positive answer 
regarding Spaniards but nothing was said about Riffians. In 1911 the chief of the 
army health service of the “territory of Nador” informed Melilla authorities again 
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about the need for “regulating health assistance for [Spanish] civilians and moors” 
in the area. In his opinion, the village of Nador had to be provided with health 
services “in similar conditions as the plazas menores [Vélez and Alhucemas] and 
the rest of villages in Spain”, because its population was rapidly expanding. The 
answer was that Spanish civilians could receive “first aid” in the military 
infirmary and be sent to the Hospital Central of Melilla in case of severe illness. 
Besides, a military doctor would visit patients at home, receiving for that work a 
supplement from the fondo de arbitrios (a precedent of the Junta de arbitrios). 
There were no regulations, however, concerning the Riffians. 
The third problem was that public health action on civil Riffians should have 
relied on local leaders and institutions and allowed them a degree of participation. 
Again, el-Roghi could have been a crucial actor but collaboration was not possible 
in the end. As a result, private initiatives were launched in the area which, at the 
same time, aroused widespread rejection by Riffians, and menaced the develop-
ment of a civil colonial public health centred in Nador. Those initiatives were 
represented by the CEMR. After the campaigns of 1909 and 1911, the company 
consolidated its mining activities in Uixán. Ruiz Albéniz had to care for the 
growing number of workers, many of them Riffians or Moroccans in general. The 
company had its own health care facilities, which were mainly intended for mild 
problems. In case of serious trauma or illness, patients were sent to Melilla. In 
addition, other complementary initiatives were taken. Dr. Ruiz Albéniz reported 
that in 1908 he promoted the creation of a “bread oven” which produced more 
than 500 kilograms of wheat bread a day, not only for workers but for “everyone 
who passed through Beni Bu Ifrur”. He claimed that “in the whole qabila, the 
daily flapjack made of barley, nutritional basis of the native family, was aban-
doned” (Ruiz Albéniz 1922). 
The conclusion of this section is that only under the “umbrella” of direct action 
of the Spanish regular army could a “colonial” military public health be sketched 
in the Eastern Rif during this period, of which countryside dispensaries were the 
most representative institutions. Local armed opposition made military public 
health the key of Spanish action in the area, much as maritime public health was 
in the Atlantic region. Then, the situation had not changed so much from former 
decades when Moroccan authority still prevailed. The direct use of military force 
in the name of the Sultan was the subterfuge to act on Moroccan territory but, at 
the same time, moved Spain away from a true “colonial” action which should 
have relied on local leaders and institutions to a greater extent. Besides, the 
connection with Spanish authorities in Western Morocco was problematic and, in 
fact, two different processes had started in each extreme of the Spanish zone of 
influence. The “Rif question” stood behind all this. 
 
The Modest Growth of the Network of Dispensaries (1913–1915). The establish-
ment of the Protectorate brought about some punctual changes that did not 
substantially alter the framework of Spanish action in the Rif. As stated before, in 
the provisional regulations of February and April 1913 the Delegate for Native 
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Services in Tettouan had been given responsibility for “hygiene and public health” 
affairs. The consuls in the cities would be his local representatives, except for the 
Melilla region, where the absence of diplomatic personnel made the Commandant 
General a de facto consul. On the other hand, a post of “Inspector of the Informa-
tion and Native Affairs Offices” was also created inside the High Commission, 
which was supposed to centralise the work of the Sub-inspection of Native Troops 
and Affairs of Melilla and of the newly created Negotiates of Natives Affairs of 
Ceuta and Larache (transformed into Sections in 1913 and Sub-inspections in 
1914). In principle, these measures would mean that the Delegate and the Inspec-
tor would co-ordinate existing countryside dispensaries in the Melilla region and 
those which were to be newly created throughout the zone in the following years. 
In practice, their power and resources were quite virtual and the connection with 
Tettouan remained very weak. In the Eastern Rif, existing dispensaries continued 
to be essentially directed from what was now called the Commandant Generalship 
of Melilla. 
However weak it was, the connection helped Nador acquire some importance as 
the regional centre of public health in the Rif. The dispensaries of Nador and Zoco 
el-Had (but especially the former) increased their activity, which consisted mainly 
of small surgical interventions, smallpox vaccination, drug dispensing, the use of 
Elmerich ointment for scabies and 606 salvarsan injections for syphilis. There 
were also some beds for isolating patients with infectious diseases or for conva-
lescence. The buildings were improved, auxiliaries were attached and houses for 
the doctors were built. During 1913, Zoco el-Had was already providing around 
300 treatments per month, and Nador, almost 1,000. In addition, doctors often 
travelled to the nearby duars (small settlements scattered throughout the country) 
to assist patients and vaccinate people in an effort to extend “attraction”. In 
November 1913 Dr. Valdés Lambea asked for and received laboratory equipment 
“to begin with the study of Riffian pathology” in Nador. This included a micro-
scope, a centrifugator and a complete set of laboratory reactives, glassware and 
instruments. With the new equipment, he expected that 
the study of regional pathology could be based on solid grounds and the diag-
nosis will be more precise and scientific, the treatments and the task we have 
been assigned will be closer to the work a doctor can conduct from modern 
dispensaries (Valdés 1914). 
In a way, Valdés was trying to act as head of Spanish military doctors in the area, 
though he was not officially acknowledged as such and lacked any administrative 
basis. Apart from obtaining the laboratory, he published a short Arabic-Riffian-
Spanish vocabulary for doctors’ use and, in 1914, the first annual report of his 
activities in the Nador dispensary. He also assumed the assistance of the Native 
Police unit called Tabor de Alhucemas, the former unit of “Shariffian Police” of 
Melilla which had been established in Nador. The other permanent dispensary, 
Zoco el-Had, was the second in importance, and its director, Dr. Lazo García, 
published his first annual report in 1913 in the Spanish medical journal Los 
progresos de la clínica with the title “La medicina militar española en el Rif”, as 
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well as a leaflet published by the Military Hygiene Institute of Madrid (Lazo 
1913). In the following years, Lazo and Valdés published a number of articles in 
other Spanish medical journals, such as the Revista de Sanidad Militar, España 
médica and Revista Clínica de Madrid. Their articles mainly consisted either of 
descriptions of rare clinical forms of diseases or of general information gathered 
about frequent diseases, without much scientific discussion or laboratory data. 
In their annual reports, Valdés and Lazo gave preferential attention to the work 
oriented towards civil Riffians. However, the bulk of patients continued to be the 
soldiers of the Native Police and Regulares, their families and relatives. As Dr. 
Lazo acknowledged, his first group smallpox vaccination was made on the 120 
soldiers of Zoco el Had’s Native Police unit, “beginning, to be exemplary, with 
the Spanish officers” (Lazo 1913). In any case, the assistance of Riffian soldiers 
could be considered as the “military side” of the “civilising” role assigned to 
dispensaries in the newly established Protectorate, even if the Native Police and 
Regulares were not formally under the authority of the Khalifa. But it was more 
difficult to justify the use of dispensaries by the Spanish regular army. When 
reading the Army personal records of Valdés, Lazo and other dispensaries’s 
doctors, it becomes clear how often they had to assist Spanish troops in the area 
and participate in military operations, with the subsequent neglect of their 
functions towards Riffians. Despite its persistence, this parallel work was seldom 
mentioned in their annual reports and caused problems. For example, the Ministry 
of State paid a supplement to doctors, constructed the buildings and provided a 
fixed amount for maintenance expenses (medical supplies). This compromise was 
confirmed after countryside dispensaries were labelled as “Makzhan dispensaries” 
in 1915, as were those in the cities. However, the ministry became reluctant to 
continue its support to countryside dispensaries as they served mainly military 
purposes. Besides, the ministry could not participate in the management of those 
centres or direct their activities because there were no consuls-interveners in the 
Rif, as there were in the Atlantic port cities. Finally, the ministry would have pre-
ferred giving preference to civil Riffians instead of Riffians soldiers. 
Despite these problems, new dispensaries were established in the Eastern Rif in 
the period 1913–1916. In May 1914, the Commandant Generalship of Melilla 
proposed to the High Commissioner that the two permanent dispensaries which 
had been planned for Atlaten and Zoco el Arbaa of Arkeman in 1911 should be 
built instead in Monte Arruit (Ait Bu-Yahi) and Tauriat Hamed (Ait Sidel). The 
reason was that in those years the occupied territory had widened, and it was now 
more convenient for the dispensaries to be located on the borders with unoccupied 
qabilas. In the budget of the Ministry of State for 1914 and 1915, credits were 
assigned for the building of those two dispensaries, as well as for three other 
permanent centres in Zaio (Ulad Settut), Yazanen (Ait Bu-Gafar) and again in 
Zoco el-Arbaa of Arkeman (Kebdana). All those five dispensaries maintained, 
however, a provisional character as part of the military infirmaries installed in 
those posts or in nearby places. For example, the facilities in Yazanen consisted of 
a wooden barrack attached to the military infirmary located inside the perimeter of 
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the garrison camp. In Monte Arruit and Tauriat Hamed, assistance of Riffians was 
the responsibility of either the garrison doctors, or of doctors from the military 
infirmaries at Atlaten and Silwan. Silwan military doctors were also in charge of 
assistance in Zaio. In Yazanen, service was provided by the doctor of its own 
infirmary, first Octavio Palazón Yebra (1914–1915), later followed by Asterio de 
Pablo Gutiérrez (1916) and Luis Muruzábal Sagües (1917). The same happened in 
Zoco el-Arbaa, with Roberto Solans Labedán (1914), Mariano Graíño Noriega 
(1915–1916) and Domingo García Doctor (1917). A permanent installation of 
these five dispensaries had to wait until 1917–1918, and then some of them 
changed their location. 
In the end, the extension of the network of countryside dispensaries continued 
to depend on the direct presence of the Army, a result of new operations, now not 
only launched in the Rif, but also in the regions of Tettouan and Larache. The 
difference from former years was their greater extent and scope. The rhetoric of 
“police operations” in the name of the Sultan and of “preventing smuggling” was 
set aside to a certain degree when the Protectorate was established, and Spain was 
able to act more freely in its zone. Thus, the years 1913–1916 saw an almost un-
interrupted series of small moves aimed at the enlargement of the territory under 
Spanish control. However, the fact that military operations by 1916 had only re-
sulted in the control of 600 km2 in Melilla and in the presence of the Spanish 
Army in less than one fifth of the small Protectorate’s territory shows the extent of 
Riffian and Jbalian armed opposition. In Melilla, General Gómez Jordana was in 
command during this period before leaving for the High Commission in Tettouan. 
Jordana fostered the development of dispensaries for natives in collaboration 
with Tettouan but kept on relying on the army as the main basis of the system. 
Military public health in the enclaves continued to be improved. For example, a 
permanent laboratory was finally established in Melilla. Its origins went back to a 
provisional centre installed by the Military Hygiene Institute of Madrid during the 
“1909 campaign”. When the combats was over, Melilla’s authorities proposed that 
the material be kept in the enclave so that a proper laboratory could be estab-
lished. Time passed until a provisional centre was attached to the first group of 
military hospitals in Melilla in 1911, during the “Kert campaign”. Although analy-
tical-bacteriological laboratories had been created in the eight peninsular 
Commandant Generalships after 1909, the Melilla laboratory had to wait until 
December 1913 to be organised on a permanent basis. Its first director was Major 
Dr. Antonio Redondo Flores (1911–1919?), later followed by Ángel Morales 
Fernández (1919–192?). Other personnel included a “chief of services”, Captain 
Dr. Paulino F. Martos, five auxiliaries – instructed soldiers from the Military 
Health Corps Brigade of Melilla – and four assistants (Calatraveño 1916). 
On the other hand, the enclaves continued to interfere on assistance of Riffians 
carried out from countryside dispensaries and on the central role of Nador in the 
area. In Melilla, the Hospital Central continued its task as well as the infirmary 
for natives, which, in Lazo’s opinion, had been actually transformed into a real 
Hospital militar indígena for it provided assistance exclusively to Moroccan 
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soldiers of the Native Police and Regulares (Lazo 1913). However, the problem of 
who should pay for civilians’ expenses began to appear, and military authorities 
and the Junta de arbitrios of Melilla often complained to the High Commissioner 
and the Ministry of State about the slow construction of civil centres. Through the 
Sub-inspection of Native Troops and Affairs and the new Sub-inspection of Mili-
tary Public Health, Melilla kept its central role over Nador. In Vélez and Alhu-
cemas, it seems probable that a specific locale for assisting Riffians was obtained 
from the government when the Protectorate was established. In Vélez, for ex-
ample, a provisional barrack was set up in March 1914 on the lowest part of the 
rock “so that female Moors and children come in greater numbers without having 
to overcome their shame of going up to the garrison”. In its first year of existence 
(March 1914 – February 1915) more than 800 patients were assisted, 23 of them 
requiring surgical intervention. Severe cases were sent to the military hospitals of 
Tettouan or Melilla. In general, the bulk of patients travelled to Vélez and 
Alhucemas from September to November, that is, the months when malaria was 
more intense. For example, 351 patients were treated in Vélez in September and 
October 1915 alone, 243 of whom were diagnosed with that disease. Serious 
malaria outbreaks were recorded in the area in 1914 and 1916. Among the mili-
tary doctors working in Alhucemas in this period were Manuel Bastos Ansart 
(1911) and Antonio Muñoz (1915). 
Finally, the army increased the number of military infirmaries and doctors in 
military posts, thus taking resources away from dispensaries and infirmaries for 
natives and overlapping with their role towards Riffians. In the Melilla region, 
there existed eight military infirmaries (Nador, Silwan, Cabo de Agua, Atlaten, 
Yazanen, Restinga, Zoco el Arbaa of Arkemam and Avanzamiento) and a good 
number of scattered military posts, in some cases with their own doctor. The 
direct presence of the army implied the complete lack of participation of Riffians 
and resulted in persisting opposition against Spanish doctors, even those of 
dispensaries. For example, the latter had to be systematically escorted by the 
Native Police when travelling to the duars due to the risk of being attacked by 
qabilians. Most patients continued to visit one or more traditional practitioners 
before going to the dispensary. Women seldom appeared, except for unmarried 
girls and older women. Doctors tried to combat this reluctance by publicizing 
success stories from clinical or surgical cases with spectacular symptoms, but 
good survival rates, in order to convince and “attract” people. For example, 
Valdés began to receive more frequent visits in Nador after he performed an 
amputation on a Riffian whose hand had been blown up by dynamite and after he 
removed a tumour from the back of another man (Valdés 1913). 
The growth of military public health in the Melilla region, either direct or in the 
form of dispensaries for natives, allowed the increase of actions towards civil 
Riffians. The task of military hospitals in the enclaves has been already com-
mented, as well as the “attraction” strategy of countryside dispensaries. Regarding 
the latter, the provisional regulations of 1913 had stated that the Delegate had to 
seek for the “confluence” of all dispensaries with the structures of the Sanitary 
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Council of Tangier. This allowed a certain participation of the Ministry of State in 
the area and a certain connection with Tettouan for the development of civil 
public health for Riffians. But results were modest. For example, the post of civil 
nurse was created in the Nador dispensary in 1914, due to the number of civilians 
assisted there. Antonio Burgos Berlanga was appointed to the post. The laboratory 
installed in Nador was partly financed by the Ministry of State given that its 
object was in principle the study of “Riffian pathology” in general, and, therefore, 
civilians could also benefit from their services. 
In contrast, public health for civil Spaniards continued its development, fostered 
by the growing number of Spanish settlers in Melilla and towns such as Nador, 
Cabo de Agua, Monte Arruit and others. The Junta de arbitrios of Melilla sub-
stantially increased its budget and a new one was created in 1916 in the village of 
Zaio, which raised to three the total number existing in the Eastern Rif. But the 
connection with the Western urban Juntas under the central direction of the 
Delegation of Native Affairs was very weak and, in practice, they remained 
dependent on the Junta de arbitrios of Melilla. Their focus on Spaniards resulted 
in few or no initiatives towards Riffians and their Spanish character prevented 
their use by the Ministry of State or the High Commission as basis for civilian 
public health. To worsen things, the Juntas began using dispensaries for assistance 
of Spaniards, thus interfering with their task towards Riffians. For example, 308 
of the 794 patients (39 per cent) assisted in Nador in a trimester of 1916 were 
Spanish settlers, while in Monte Arruit they comprised 60 of 137 (43 per cent). 
Finally, in advanced areas private companies continued to be important health 
care providers. In the iron mines of Ait Bu Ifrur, Dr. Ruiz Albéniz continued with 
his task until 1923, when he turned over the post to Dr. Lope García de Obeso. 
The number of miners working for the now called Compañía Española de Minas 
del Rif (CEMR) rose to some two thousand during this period. Many of the 
workers were Spaniards, but the rest came from all over the Rif and beyond. Local 
rejection to this initiative was probably even more intense than in the case of the 
dispensaries. 
 
The Paradoxical Definition of Nador as Regional Centre (1916–1918). The Pro-
tectorate regulations of January 1916 confirmed the creation of the Health In-
spection inside the Delegation of Native Affairs. In principle, this was a new step 
towards integration of countryside and urban dispensaries under a single technical 
organisation centralised in Tettouan. As it was said before, this measure was the 
result of a greater freedom of movement of Spain in Morocco due to World War I. 
Precisely, Spain had been able to increase diplomatic force against Morocco 
through the “denunciation” of the Sanitary Council of Tangier. Freedom of move-
ment also allowed Spanish authorities to challenge Moroccan military sovereignty 
and have direct interaction with local leaders who lacked official or international 
status. But contacts could only be pacific and collaborative in this period because 
France pressured Spain not to undertake direct military operations while their own 
were prevented by the war. 
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The result was a modest reinforcement of Tettouan as military centre of Spanish 
Morocco, including public health. Although the Inspection of Troops and Native 
Affairs Offices of the High Commission ceased to exist in the new regulations, the 
newly created Sub-inspection of Native Affairs and Troops of Tettouan occupied 
its place in some way. Collaboration of General Gómez Jordana with the Jbalian 
leader Ahmed el-Raisuni led to the creation of dispensaries in Laucién (Beni Ider) 
and Ain Yir in September 1917, which served mainly to assist Spanish troops and 
Raisuni’s harka in their joint operations against Anghera. The Sub-inspection of 
Tettouan was responsible for those dispensaries and was also in charge of assis-
ting the first official Makhzan troops, the so-called Mejalas Xerifianas or Mehalas 
Jalifianas (created in 1913), though they were still reduced to little more than a 
personal guard of the Khalifa in Tettouan. Given that the chief of the Sub-
inspection was the High Commissioner himself, it began to assume a central role 
in native affairs in some way. 
Though essentially important, these changes were in the end more formal than 
effective for the Melilla region. In the first case, the reach of the Health Inspection 
was limited by the impossibility of appointing delegates in the Rif, due to the 
absence of civil hospitals, infirmaries or dispensaries in the area. In the second 
case, the Sub-inspection of Native Affairs and Troops of Melilla kept its position 
ahead of Tettouan. This weak connection with Tettouan implied that the role of 
Nador as a regional centre continued to be secondary. Collaboration with local 
leaders fostered by the new Commandant General of Melilla, General Aizpuru 
was far less relevant than in the Western zone and did not help Nador either. In 
fact, military operations were brought to a halt between 1916 and 1918, and no 
new countryside dispensaries could be created. The only change was that some of 
them were moved to more convenient places before the operations ended or just 
after. For example, it was proposed that the two dispensaries in Monte Arruit and 
Tauriat Hamed be re-located near the new borders with the non-occupied territory. 
In the end it was only the latter that was transferred, first to the post of Ras Tiker-
min (Mtalza) in May 1916 and afterwards to the post of Yarf el-Baax (Mtalza) at 
the end of that year or the beginning of 1917. 
The annual report published in 1918 by Lieutenant Dr. Policarpo Carrasco 
about his work in the dispensary of Yarf el-Baax that appeared as a journal article 
in the Revista de Sanidad Militar provides an example of the work done in the 
countryside during this period (Carrasco 1918). In the last seven months of 1917, 
Dr. Carrasco assisted 1,152 patients, mainly from the qabilas of Guelaia, Mtalza 
and Ait Said. He prescribed sulphate and quinine chloride for malaria, Ehmerich 
ointment for scabies, opium derivates for pain, atropine for heart disorders or 
analgesics for headaches. He applied antiseptics to leg ulcers and recommended 
specific diets for different gastrointestinal disorders. He also conducted surgery on 
a native policeman to remove a bullet that was lodged in his abdomen. There was 
regular contact with the Hospital indígena and the Laboratory of Melilla. On the 
one hand, severe cases of illness, trauma and gun wounds were treated in Melilla 
after first being sent to the military infirmary in Kandussi. On the other hand, 
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Major Dr. Redondo Flores visited the area on several occasions to inspect the 
location and sanitary conditions of the military camps and proposed hygienic 
measures and works on the river beds to decrease the high incidence of malaria 
among the troops. Following his suggestions, Dr. Carrasco himself proceeded to 
treat wastewater dumps with petrol and ordered the periodic ventilation of tents. 
Yet, traditional problems persisted. For example, the high price of quinine 
limited its systematic use, a treatment that mainly was used only “for the natives 
of the 10th unit of Native Police and for some civilian Moors”. The most severe 
cases of trauma and wounds were in practice due to armed incidents (including 
bomb explosions) between qabilians and the native policemen. It is not strange 
that Carrasco made some remarks about the “great limitations” of his work and 
the influence of the “very peculiar characteristics of our relationships with the 
natives of non-submissive territory [namely, the qabila of Ait Said] on the number 
of patients assisted in the dispensary and on nearby military posts”. The dis-
pensary provided assistance, not only to Riffian soldiers of the Native Police and 
Regulares but also to a “considerable” number of Spanish troops, though statistics 
were not published because “this task is not a part of its official mission” (Car-
rasco 1918). In short, assistance to Riffian civilians must have been still quite 
reduced. 
Traditional interventions also persisted in Nador. For example, the military 
laboratory of Melilla became more sophisticated. In 1916, it comprised six depart-
ments: 1) clinical analysis; 2) hygienic analysis; 3) bacteriology and parasitology; 
4) normal and pathological histology; 5) sera and vaccines; and 6) general ser-
vices. It acted as the depot for vaccines and sera sent by the Military Hygiene 
Institute of Madrid for Spanish troops and countryside dispensaries. Thus, it could 
proceed to deploy periodical vaccination campaigns against smallpox and typhoid 
fever, mainly on Spanish recruits. Other functions included the periodical inspec-
tion of military centres and camps and research on malarial foci, plague outbreaks 
and other diseases. Dr. Redondo expected that the laboratory would become an 
“Institute of Colonial Hygiene” in charge of the technical direction of the Protec-
torate’s sanitary policy, from which the existing laboratories in Ceuta, Larache 
and Tangier would depend (Calatraveño 1916). However, the “great expectations” 
of Dr. Redondo were far from reality. The human and material resources of the 
laboratory were insufficient, and diseases such as malaria and syphilis remained 
extensive (Molero Mesa 2003). Competition between Melilla, Tangier and Lara-
che resulted in a general lack of co-ordination. On the other hand, military hospi-
tals of the enclaves continued their task of “attraction”. In September 1916, the 
dispensaries of Vélez and Alhucemas received authorisation from Melilla to pro-
vide free medicines to “manifestly poor natives”, as did countryside dispensaries. 
The number of patients assisted increased due to a new malaria outbreak in 1918. 
Finally, the network of military infirmaries and posts was not very much altered 
due to inactivity, except for the creation of a new infirmary in Kandussi. 
However, a crucial process started which would become more important in the 
following years. If the higher definition of Tettouan as centre of Makhzan military 
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public health and of Nador as regional office was not relevant in absolute terms 
during this period, it began to be so in relative terms. The reason was paradoxical: 
the Ministries of War, State and Interior started to freeze their direct contribution 
to Spanish activities in Morocco. If Protectorate organisms were to enjoy more 
autonomy with the new regulation, then they would have to count only on their 
own financial, material and human resources without calling for direct support 
from those ministries. This meant, on the one hand, the impossibility of expanding 
the modest network of dispensaries and infirmaries for natives. By contrast, it 
meant also that they were assuming assistance to Riffians with less interference 
from Spanish institutions in Tangier and the Spanish enclaves. 
In the case of the Ministy of War, the Military Public Health Section began to 
think if it should keep on providing free drugs for countryside dispensaries or if, 
on the contrary, they should be financed by the Ministry of State. Besides, the 
Military Hygiene Institute, which sent vaccines and sera to the laboratories in 
Melilla, Larache and Ceuta, complained about the burden it posed for the ade-
quate operation of military laboratories in Spain. These questions were important 
because the army contribution for the assistance of Riffian soldiers and civilians 
must have been high in absolute and sometimes in relative terms. In 1915, for 
example, the health budget accounted for 4.3 per cent of the total budget of the 
Ministry of War destined for “Action in Morocco” (4.7 million out of a total of 
108 million pesetas). In 1917 this percentage essentially remained at 4.2 per cent 
(4.2 million out of a total of 100 million pesetas). It has been impossible to know 
how much money was assigned exclusively for Riffians and how much for the 
Melilla region, because the budget for “Action in Morocco” was not detailed. But 
given that the army paid for wages of the dispensaries’ doctors, for vaccines, 
drugs and equipment of those centres, for hospital care of Riffian soldiers and 
their families and relatives in Melilla, and for “attraction” from the enclaves, it 
seems clear that cuts in the budget should have been crucial. The army started to 
concentrate on Spanish troops and to abandon its traditional role of “attraction” 
from Spanish enclaves. 
On the other hand, the Ministry of State kept its contribution to the Sanidad 
Majzén at a standstill. In fact, its financial support for the Melilla region decreased 
from 43,880 pesetas for seven dispensaries in 1915 to 31,950 pesetas for nine 
dispensaries in 1918–1921. The civil nurse in the dispensary of Nador had to 
leave his post in the summer of 1916 because the ministry stopped paying his 
wages. Finally, the Junta de arbitrios of Melilla asked for assistance to Riffians in 
the Hospital Central to be charged to the Protectorate’s budget. The Junta de 
arbitrios reported that the expenses for hospitalisation in Melilla were equal to the 
whole budget of the Sanidad Majzén (about 68,000 pesetas) and were compro-
mising measures directed towards the Spanish population. Both ministries focused 
more and more on Spaniards, either in the civil hospitals and infirmaries of the 
Western region, or in the activities of the Juntas de arbitrios in the Eastern Rif. 
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Military Expansionism and the Authoritarianism of General Silvestre (1918–
1921). The Protectorate health regulations issued in 1918 deepened previous 
developments. Those regulations organised the consultative branch of the Health 
Inspection through the creation of the Central Health Board and the Local Health 
Boards. This measure extended the theoretical reach of Tettouan towards country-
side dispensaries in the Melilla region. Despite the lack of consuls-interveners in 
the area and of civil hospitals or infirmaries, it was the head officers of the units of 
Native Police who were supposed to act as general representatives of the Delegate 
of Native Affairs for public health affairs. However, the relative connection 
achieved between urban and rural, civilian and military dispensaries, the relative 
extension of the Sanidad Majzén to the Eastern Rif in this period, owed more to 
the growing authoritarianism of the High Commissioner. As has been said pre-
viously, the regulations of 1918 allowed the High Commissioner to personally 
control the appointment of many members of the consultative boards, depriving 
the Health Inspector and even the Delegate of Native Affairs of much of their 
power. 
In addition, a number of military regulations issued between 1918 and 1921 
gave the High Commissioner greater control of the Native Affairs administration 
of the army. For example, on December 11, 1918, the Commandant Generalship 
of Larache became subordinated to that of Ceuta-Tettouan. This affected all 
departments, including the Sub-inspection of Troops and Native Affairs. A second 
decree, issued January 25, 1919, appointed General Berenguer as chief inspector 
of the Army, not only in the Protectorate but also in Ceuta and Melilla, with the 
honours of “Crown Minister”. Among his new personal powers, he became head 
of a new Direction of Offices and Centres of Information and Police. Everything 
concerning the “recruitment, organisation and posts” of the Native Affairs admini-
stration of the army was decided by him directly, although he could delegate his 
authority to the General Commandants (Cordero Torres 1943; Villanova 2004). In 
July 1920, a royal order of the Ministry of War confirmed that countryside dispen-
saries were dependant on the Sub-inspections of Native Troops and Affairs and 
not on the Military Public Health sections of the Commandant Generalships, thus 
supporting the control of the High Commissioner. 
As a result of his personal concentration of civil and military power, General 
Berenguer began to manage public health affairs by himself or through his 
secretary. He was in direct touch with the Ministries of State and War for these 
issues, leaving no technical autonomy to the Health Inspector. In the Eastern Rif, 
he managed to appoint a Consul-Intervener for Nador in 1919, who established 
the first Junta local de intervención in the area. This fact resulted in some impor-
tant civil public health projects being planned for Nador, which attempted to 
finally make this town the regional centre of Sanidad Majzén in the area associ-
ated with Tettouan. First, a “service for analysis of food and drink” was demanded 
in July 1919, because the existing laboratory in Melilla was limiting its service to 
the city. The Consul-Intervener argued that some peninsular food factories selling 
their products in the area had been affected by trichinosis or lacked proper 
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sanitary conditions, with subsequent danger for human health. In his opinion, it 
was a fact that “beverages elaborated with industrial alcohols and oils (so much 
employed by the qabilas) made not only from olives, and drinks sweetened with 
saccharine” were being widely sold in the area. Thus, it was necessary to establish 
this service to control the hygienic quality of products. In fact, the consul pro-
posed that a service to control the cantinas in the “European villages” be created 
under direction of the new Junta comarcal of Nador (former Junta de arbitrios) 
and another one for “native consumers and cantinas established outside the peri-
meter of military camps, which sell articles to the non-military public”, under the 
direction of the Consulate-Intervention. 
Second, the High Commissioner proposed to the Ministry of State the creation 
of a mixed infirmary in Nador in the spring of 1921, so that clinical and surgical 
care could be provided for all Eastern Rif patients. General Fernández Silvestre 
offered installation of a barrack of 45 x 10 m. in the town, but the proposal was 
rejected due to poor hygienic conditions. The Delegation of Public Works of the 
High Commission was charged with planning a project that would meet all the 
technical requirements and that would be financed by the civil construction 
section of the Protectorate budget. Its status would be the same as that of the 
mixed infirmaries built in Asilah and Ksar el-Kebir, and to the one being planned 
simultaneously for Chefchauen. Third, after February 1921, the Military Hygiene 
Institute of Madrid refused to send more sera and vaccines to the laboratory of 
Melilla for use in the countryside dispensaries. This fact moved the Commandant 
General Fernández Silvestre to request that the High Commissioner created a 
“depot of sera and vaccines” in the Eastern Rif, so that these products could be 
supplied to all countryside dispensaries in the area and vaccination campaigns 
could be launched. The High Commissioner agreed with the proposal and con-
tacted the Ministry of State to decide where it should be located, though, in his 
opinion, “it seems natural that it was the dispensary of Nador, whose town is 
regarded as capital or head of that region”. 
In the end, none of these projects materialised before the Rif War. If they had 
succeeded, Nador would have been able to effectively lead and co-ordinate the 
network of countryside dispensaries in the area. But this network expanded, none-
theless, with the creation of two more centres in 1918–1921. One of them was 
located in Kaddur (Ait Sidel), whose director was Francisco Irañeta y Urriza 
(1919–1920) and later Severiano Bustamante y Fernández de Luco (1921). The 
other was located in Reyén/Hassi Berkan (Ait Bu Yahi), directed by Roberto 
Solans Labedán (1918–1919), Manuel Peris Torres (1920) and Elías Nager 
Martínez (1921). Besides, the five provisional dispensaries previously existing in 
the area were made permanent. In Monte Arruit, the directors were Benito Roldán 
Sevilla (1918–1919) and José Espina Rull (1920–1921); in Zaio, Francisco 
Rodríguez González (1918), Elías Nager Martínez (1919–1920) and Eugenio 
Martín Alonso (1921); in Zoco el-Arbaa of Arkeman, Domingo García Doctor 
(1918–1920) and Ramón Jiménez Muñoz (1921); in Sammar (previously, 
Yazanen), Luis Muruzábal Sagüés (1918), José Malva López (1919–1920) and 
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Damián Navarro García (1921–1922); and in Ras Tikermin/Yarf el-Baax, Poli-
carpo Carrasco (1918), Juan García y Gutiérrez (1919–1920) and José Ventosa y 
Pasoda (1921). The last statistics collected of countryside dispensaries were those 
of 1919. In the first trimester of that year, Kaddur had made 334 treatments, 
Sammar, 294, Hassi Berkan, 360, Zoco el-Arbaa, 453 and Monte Arruit, 488. 
Apart from the authoritarianism of the High Commissioner, the higher defi-
nition of the Sanidad Majzén in the Eastern Rif with Nador as its centre was 
favoured by less interference from Melilla and the other enclaves, whose task of 
“attraction” was substantially reduced. For example, the Junta de arbitrios of 
Melilla and military authorities refused to pay for assistance of Riffians on the 
Hospital Central and focused its resources on the growing Spanish population and 
the permanent garrisons. In the case of Vélez and Alhucemas, “attraction” had 
never achieved great success. For example, in Vélez, less than 1,000 patients were 
assisted in 1915, an insignificant number given that the central Rif and Ghomara, 
despite the lack of urban centres, were densely populated areas within which 
almost half of the population of Spanish Morocco was concentrated. It was not 
surprise, because Native Police and Regulares were always the main original 
impulse for dispensaries, but physical separation from the coast prevented their 
creation in the peñones. In fact, neither doctors, nor officers were ever allowed to 
travel or visit the qabilas. In contrast, dispensaries increased their work towards 
Spanish settlers, even if their number was inevitably small. In both enclaves, there 
existed Juntas de arbitrios which benefited from dispensaries intended in prin-
ciple for Riffians. Finally, from 1918 on, periodical in-communication reduced 
even more their work of “attraction”. A severe outbreak of malaria in the central 
Rif in September 1918 was not followed by an increase of the work of dispen-
saries as in the outbreaks of 1914 and 1916. Instead, it was decided to forbid the 
travel of patients to the dispensaries on the grounds of the “sanitary menace” they 
posed for the Spaniards. “In-communication” became a way of pressuring the 
Riffians, especially when hunger struck the area in 1919–1921, but it also re-
vealed the tendency of both enclaves to concentrate on their own interests. 
Direct interference from the ministries of State and War was also reduced, even 
if this had as many positive aspects as negative ones. The first ministry distrusted 
the experiences of past years, when its contribution to dispensaries had been dis-
torted by the preferential assistance provided to Riffian and Spanish soldiers. 
When General Berenguer asked State to request laboratory products from the 
Alfonso XIII Hygiene Institute of Madrid for the future depot of Nador, the mini-
stry declined the proposal on the grounds that expenses in Melilla and its region 
should be assumed by the Ministry of War or by the Ministry of Interior. The 
creation of the mixed infirmary and the laboratory of analysis were not supported 
on similar grounds, though another factor was also the general reduction of the 
Ministry’s expenses in Morocco and its subsequent concentration on its particular 
“Spanish” interests. 
On the other hand, the Ministry of War focused more and more in the interests 
of the regular army. The defeat of Germany in World War I resulted in Spain 
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being able to re-start more intense operations in its zone without the risk of being 
disturbed so much by complaints of Moroccan authorities or other foreign coun-
tries. The period 1918–1921 saw the extension of controlled territory as it more 
than doubled, reaching a peak of about 50 per cent of the total of Spanish 
Morocco. In Melilla, the campaign gained momentum under command of General 
Fernández Silvestre, who in less than one year (May 1920–March 1921) doubled 
the territory under Spanish control. The area rose to some 4,000 km2 and included 
new qabilas such as Mtalza, Ait Said, Ait Ulishek, Tafersit and fractions of Ait 
Tuzin and Temsamam. The rapid advance of the Army required more resources, 
but the Spanish government sought to put a stop to the astronomical military 
budget (more than 40 per cent of total state expenses) and to the use of Spanish 
troops abroad (in consonance with European developments after WWI). Thus, the 
Ministry of War reduced its contributions to Protectorate public health, suppressed 
its activities in Tangier, French Morocco and Cape Juby and proceeded to a 
general re-organisation of the Army health service in Spanish Morocco which 
took place in 1920–1921. In the first case, the supply of drugs, vaccines and sera 
or medical equipment to countryside dispensaries was reduced, especially to 
Nador, which was increasing its civil activities by the decision of Tettouan. 
In short, a unified, centralised public health system was about to extend itself to 
both extremes of Spanish Morocco after fifteen years of efforts. The authorita-
rianism of the High Commission and the decreasing direct role of the Ministries of 
War and State resulted in more administrative, institutional or political autonomy 
for the Sanidad Majzén and in a relative degree of connection between the Atlan-
tic region and the Eastern Rif. This was achieved at the cost of less technical auto-
nomy for the Health Inspector when facing the High Commissioner and doctors 
when facing consuls-interveners and military chiefs. However, the Protectorate 
health system seemed to be reaching its limits, even if half of Spanish Morocco 
was still outside its control. The Sanidad Majzén suffered from severe deficiencies 
in the Eastern Rif which provoked discontent in qabilians, either civilians or 
soldiers. 
For example, in the “pacified” zone dispensaries which were at last in a position 
of increasing their action towards civil Riffians, had to act in unfavourable condi-
tions. On the one hand, they could count on less money from the Ministry of State 
and less material from the Ministry of War. The possibility of suppressing some 
centres and the replacement of military doctors by civilians were even considered, 
given that the army needed more personnel on the vanguard. On the other hand, 
more effort was required to “attract” civilians to the dispensary than had been 
necessary for native troops. For example, dispensary doctors were given horses to 
be able to visit the duars and assist qabilians at home, probably because “spontan-
eous” visits were not so frequent. Finally, Spanish settlers began to use the dispen-
saries. The Juntas of towns outside Melilla had developed, especially the one in 
Nador, which became a Junta comarcal (county board). Doctors were hired to 
assist the Spanish poor and civil cemeteries were built in some of them. However, 
they lacked health facilities and therefore, in towns such as Nador and Monte 
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Arruit, a growing number of Spaniards was assisted in the dispensaries for 
natives, with the subsequent harm for the Riffians’ interests. Finally, the delay of 
the projects of laboratory, infirmary and vaccine depot in Nador contributed to the 
discrediting of the Tettouan initiatives, which had never been viewed with enthu-
siasm in the Rif. 
Assistance to Riffian soldiers also worsened. The growing number of Native 
Police units (those which had been newly created and those which had been 
moved to the front) and the two groups of Regulares were widely used for the new 
operations because the government had reduced the Spanish regular forces by one 
third. Native troops not only suffered from higher casualties in operations, but 
they were also badly assisted because of the lack of specific health facilities in the 
newly occupied territories. A project for creating dispensaries for natives in Dar 
Drius, Sidi Hossain, Zoco el-Telata and the qabila of Temsamam was considered 
in 1920 which could have helped solve this problem while starting the “attraction” 
policy in those qabilas. However, the project was finally postponed due to the 
lack of resources and personnel. The doctors in the dispensaries had been given 
horses for following Native Police units in their operations, but their multiple 
tasks made this measure clearly insufficient. Given the situation, Riffian soldiers 
could not be very content with Tettouan’s decisions. In sum, the absolute number 
of Riffian civilians and soldiers receiving health care in the Eastern Rif had 
increased in the period 1918–1921 but, in relation to the total territory and popu-
lation now under Spanish control, the percentage had decreased and, besides, the 
services provided became more precarious. This fact surely contributed to the in-
creasing discontent in the occupied qabilas with a Protectorate system whose 
deployment was becoming so problematic. 
In this situation, the impulse for consolidation of the Sanidad Majzén depended 
on new military advances which finally reached the central Rif, the ultimate 
objective of the Spanish army in Melilla for almost fifteen years. The modest 
success of Nador and of the network of countryside dispensaries in the Eastern Rif 
had been a result of military operations of the regular army. Only the new and 
rapid advances of 1918–1921 and the displacement of the bulk of the army and 
native forces deeper into Riffian territory had allowed the creation of a “pacified” 
zone around Melilla, leaving enough space for the Sanidad Majzén to appear. 
However, the cut of expenses prevented a real growth of the army health service 
and caused, instead, a redistribution of centres and personnel towards the front 
line. The military infirmaries of Restinga, Zoco el-Arbaa, Atlaten, Yazanen and 
Monte Arruit were suppressed while new ones were created in Kaddur and Dar 
Drius, plus two hospitals in Dar Drius and one in Annual. The infirmaries of 
Kandussi, Silwan and Cabo de Agua were kept. Dar Drius had become the new 
advanced centre of the army health service in the Rif instead of Silwan. 
Concentration of forces and resources on the front was an attempt to achieve the 
decisive goal but showed the difficulties of Spain and the extent of local oppo-
sition. It was more difficult than ever to speak of a “police operation” as prepara-
tives ressembled those for war. It seemed clear that the central Rif would have to 
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be conquered and defeated, even if that would imply a complete move away from 
Protectorate obligations, even from the usual procedures of the Melilla region. 
Important harkas of significant size begun to be organised by initiative of the Ait 
Waryaghar and some attacks were launched against Vélez and Alhucemas. For 
example, during the malaria outbreak in 1918, Spanish authorities in Vélez 
informed Melilla that  
On the occasion of the closure of this enclave due to the epidemic, a great 
effervescence dominates the nearby campo, to the point of menace of fire if 
they [qabilians] are not allowed to travel to the enclave. I have been told by 
some chiefs with whom I have got in touch that the most intransigent are the 
Beni Urriaguel, which are trying to gather qabilas to attack the enclave. [...] if 
the way is not left open for them, they will make war. I have received a 
proposal from the qabilas of Bocoya, Beni Iteft and Beni-Bu-Frah that if they 
are allowed to pass, they would stand guard to prevent the Beni Ammart from 
coming, as they are the only ones affected by the epidemic [...]. 
While waiting for combat, the Spanish profited from hunger in the Rif to obtain 
submission from local chiefs, even if this meant clearly abandoning its mission of 
“protection” (Madariaga 1999). In fact, the rapid advances of General Silvestre 
were based on this strategy, which suited well with the lack of means of the 
Spanish army. On the other hand, the supposed mineral riches of the central Rif 
moved some Spanish capitalists to try and obtain direct concessions for exploit-
ation from the Riffians instead of through the French Sultan and the Spanish 
Khalifa. In this way, benefits would be higher and the subsequent monopoly 
would not be endangered by foreign intervention or Protectorate regulation. While 
Spanish military officers or even the dispensary doctors were not allowed to enter 
into the central Rif, a representative of a Spanish mining company, Antonio Got, 
travelled periodically to Ait Waryaghar in 1921 and contacted Riffian represen-
tatives to negotiate permission for exploitation (Ruiz Albéniz 1922). Mining 
activities would probably be accompanied by private health initiatives such as 
those displayed by the CEMR. 
In short, brutalisation and abuses of different sorts were progressively seen as 
the only effective means of extending Spanish control into the heart of the Rif. If 
the increasing use of force had been essential for the development of public health 
in the Eastern qabilas, the only way of overcoming resistance in the central Rif 
was a greater degree of force. No room would be available for participation of 
central Riffians, less that there was once for el-Roghi and Guelaians. That was the 
authoritarian move made by General Silvestre, a personal detour that moved 
Spanish action in Eastern Morocco further away from the theoretical protectorate 
it had agreed to. It should be said, however, that this move was not exclusive of 
Melilla aurhorities because General Berenguer had been engaged in open war with 
el-Raisuni in Jbala since 1918. The difference was that the lack of means in 
Melilla and the embryonic situation of Protectorate structures in the area made 
brutal and abusive measures more clear.  
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Yet, these procedures were characteristic of Spanish Morocco as a whole, even 
if it was the decisions of General Silvestre that finally failed and the opposition of 
the central Rif under the leadership of Abd el-Krim that finally succeeded. Here, 
the expulsion of the Spaniards and the rejection of the Sultan were progressively 
seen as the only solution for ensuring respect for identity and autonomy of action. 
The only way for central Riffians to create a health system was to establish it 
themselves. This required a concentrarion of power over traditional social struc-
tures in the area in order to oblige people to fight as well as a complete rejection 
of “colonial” or “protectorate” collaboration with Spaniards and even of 
Moroccan sovereignty. That was the authoritarian move made by Abd el-Krim, 
and his success in 1921 was the final proof that “Riffian realities” could not be 
denied. 
Conclusion 
The Limits of Colonial Public Health in Spanish Morocco 
After the events of Annual in July 1921 and the fall of the whole structure of 
Spanish action in the Melilla region, the Riffians and Ghomarians under the 
command of Abd el-Krim prolonged their triumphal march until they controlled 
about 80 per cent of Spanish Morocco by mid-1925 and a part of the French Pro-
tectorate in the vicinity of Taza and Fez. The “Republic of the Rif” was pro-
claimed and a Riffian government was established which carried out a series of 
administrative, religious, military and economic reforms to ensure its indepen-
dence and the success of operations against the Spanish and French armies. Public 
health was included among these reforms. Medical material was obtained from the 
defeated Spanish Army, including a fully-equipped military hospital in Chef-
chauen, hastily abandoned as the army withdrew from the city in 1925. A number 
of Moroccan doctors as well as some foreigners, such as Dr. Walter Hutyens, 
worked for the Riffians, especially providing health care for the troops. As part of 
a campaign for international recognition, Abd el-Krim asked the International 
Committee of the Red Cross for medical aid and sought help from Muslim chari-
ties and civil associations in Great Britain and other parts of the world. He also 
attempted to be admitted to the League of Nations. His final defeat in March 1926 
by the combined effort of France and Spain and the end of the Rif War in the 
following year put an end to the brief trajectory of an independent and modest 
“Riffian public health”. 
The end of the Rif War was paralleled by the signing of an agreement among 
the European powers about Tangier. A regulation was approved which gave the 
city and its surroundings the status of an “International Zone”, to be governed by a 
complicated set of institutions in which French, British and Spanish represen-
tatives played different roles. The separation of Tangier from the French and 
Spanish Protectorates was finally confirmed. In public health matters, the most 
important consequence was the end of the Sanitary Council of Tangier, which was 
replaced by a Commission of Hygiene and Public Works whose actions were re-
stricted to the international zone. Interference in sanitary questions from Tangier 
 245 
was then reduced to a minimum, though probably not completely stopped. France 
and Spain could finally organise health services on their own in their respective 
Protectorates, although they kept their presence in the city on the Strait through 
different clinical and research institutions. The agreement concerning Tangier also 
brought about a better separation of both Protectorates which led to a reduction of, 
if not an end to, French public health activities in Spanish Morocco and vice-
versa. 
Perhaps the victory over Riffians and the agreement concerning Tangier did not 
put an end to Moroccan and Riffian initiatives against foreign domination, but that 
is another story. However, both events marked the end of a phase in Morocco’s 
history, including the history of its public health. The present article has tried to 
clarify some important issues regarding this historical phase, first in Morocco as a 
whole during the 19th century, later in the Spanish zone of influence between 1906 
and 1921. Perhaps the most important and general conclusion is that, contrary to 
what has been usually stated, Moroccan authorities worried about public health 
and had the ability to actively influence its development to a significant extent. 
The general mechanisms of authoritarianism and diversification and the primacy 
of the maritime and military branches of the health system reflected Moroccan 
agency and placed the country’s public health in an intermediate position between 
that of a “typical” European country and that of a “typical” colony. As a result of 
those efforts, public health structures continued to influence the Spanish and 
French zones of influence after Algeciras and the protectorate treaties. 
In this sense, the current analysis has allowed a definition of the Moroccan case 
on its own “intermediate” or “transitional” terms without relying, on the one hand, 
on colonialist schemes or on nationalist premises. The colonialist view has tended 
to deprive Morocco of much of its historical agency by magnifying European 
domination either to confirm or to deny its effects. Post-colonialist accounts often 
fail to grasp Moroccan initiatives because these were stronger, more autonomous 
and more organised than a mere resistance to or a distortion of European deci-
sions. The lack of post-colonial studies for Morocco and for the Maghreb at large 
is probably not only a result of their academic “marginality”, as Edmund Burke III 
puts it (Burke III 2000), but of the inadequacy of those schemes for the Moroccan 
case (although the author has criticised colonialism and nationalism as “essentiali-
sing narratives” that should be abandoned). Regarding nationalism, it has ex-
aggerated the degree of autonomy and cohesion of Morocco over the influence of 
European countries reagarding traditional Arabic institutions or the specificities of 
certain regions and communities (Riffians, Berbers of the Atlas, Saharaouis, black 
population, Jewish communities). On this basis, the present analysis could also be 
useful for a better understanding of the history of public health in the Medi-
terranean countries in general, which were generally affected by processes of 
foreign influence and internal fragmentation. The Mediterranean of the 19th and 
first half of the 20th centuries would be better conceived as a zone where diffe-
rences in public health between the North and the South, the East and the West, 
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the European and the Arab-Islamic countries, were more matter of degree than of 
kind. 
Of course, differences existed and Moroccan agency was insufficient to finally 
ensure its “sanitary independence”. However, it was the relative development 
achieved by Morocco’s health system after the 19th century which explains why 
France and especially Spain had serious difficulties in establishing a new health 
system in their zones of influence. For Spain, these difficulties were paradigmati-
cally expressed in the “questions” of Tangier and the Rif, which led to a never-
ending series of incidents essentially reflecting its impotence to proceed within the 
framework of the legal regulations of Algeciras and the Treaty of the Protectorate. 
“Tangerian ghosts” and “Riffian realities” became a nightmare for Spanish action 
in Morocco well after 1912. 
In the end, the health system in Spanish Morocco in the period 1906–1921 
failed to be established on Protectorate/colonial grounds, despite its formal appea-
rance. A protectorate public health seemed to exist through the creation of a 
General Health Inspection into the Delegation of Native Affairs of the High 
Commission and its consultative branch composed of a Central Health Board and 
Local Health Boards in which Moroccan authorities were represented. The so-
called Sanidad Majzén comprised port services, urban and countryside dispen-
saries, mixed infirmaries and infirmaries for natives, all exclusively financed by 
the Protectorate’s budget from 1918 on. Moroccan auxiliary personnel were em-
ployed in different institutions. This system managed to reach the Melilla region 
where, for many years, public health was essentially framed within a specific 
Native Affairs Administration of the army with a kind of colonial “flavour”. Here, 
Moroccans enrolled as soldiers of the Native Police and Regulares were assisted 
in countryside dispensaries, as well as their families and relatives. 
However, appearances were deceiving. The higher responsibility for public 
health was not merely an intervention imposed by Spanish authorities but was 
directly assumed by the Delegate of Native Affairs and the High Commissioner 
from 1918 on to avoid constant interference from Tangier and from the dangers of 
French expansionism. This was an act of diplomatic force that had started with the 
strategy of the local boards and was accelerated by the German defeat in World 
War I. So the Sanidad Majzén was not based on “protection” but on “seizure”. On 
the other hand, the increase of military operations in the Protectorate from 1918 
on led to mounting confrontation with local opposition in what seemed more a 
war than colonisation. Both tendencies were confirmed after 1921 with the almost 
simultaneous closure of the Tangier and Rif questions. The Tangier Statute was 
then negotiated directly by Great Britain, France, Spain and Italy without the 
participation of the Sultan of Morocco or its delegate. The Rif War became a 
“European style” campaign (Gershovich 2000) with tens of thousands of deaths 
on each side, with the first aero-naval joint operations in history and merciless 
gas-bombings. Despite Gustavo Pittaluga’s and Francisco Ruiz Morote’s 
opinions, dispensaries for natives had not succeeded in their tasks of “civilisation” 
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and “pacification”, but rather could only be established throughout Spanish 
Morocco as a result of harsh combat and diplomatic force. 
Therefore, the degree of diplomatic and military force used against Morocco 
and the Rif makes the terms “protectorate” and “colony” inadequate. The Spanish 
zone was rather an occupied or conquered area, with an authoritarian admini-
stration. Conversely, the tremendous effort required to finally achieve “pacifica-
tion” had serious consequences for Spain, namely the establishment of the dicta-
torship of General Miguel Primo de Rivera (1923–1930), which had important 
effects in the field of public health. This impact at home is just another proof of 
why Spanish action in Morocco can hardly be defined as “colonisation”. 
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